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THE FOGGY ROAD FOR EVALUATING PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
LIFTING THE HAZE FROM THE BMW/STATE FARM GUIDEPOSTS
Steven L. Chanenson1
John Y. Gotanda2*

I. Introduction
In recent years, punitive damages awards have increased in
frequency and size.3

According to one study, between 1996 and 2001,

the annual number of punitive damages awards in excess of $100 million
doubled and, in 2001 alone, over $162 billion in punitive damages were
awarded at trial or affirmed on appeal.4 Indeed, the amount of some
awards is staggering.

For example, in Pennzoil Company v. Texaco,

Inc., a jury assessed $10 billion in punitive damages.5 This phenomenon
has caused the United States Supreme Court to reevaluate its
jurisprudence on the constitutionality of excessive punitive damages
awards.6
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. As Justice O’Connor has pointed out:

As little as 30 years ago, punitive damages awards were
“rarely assessed”

and usually “small in amount.”

Recently, however, the frequency and size of such awards
have been skyrocketing.

One commentator notes that

“hardly a month goes by without a multimillion-dollar
punitive damages verdict in a product liability case.”
And it appears that the upward trajectory continues
unabated.

TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 500 (1993)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
4

. See Richard L. Blatt, et al., Punitive Damages: A State-by-

State Guide to Law and Practice 12, 17 (2003).

In fact, the study

reports that in 1992, there were no punitive damages awards in excess
of $100 million, but in 2001, there were 16 such awards. Id. at 12.
5

. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987).

The

largest reported punitive damages award was in Engle v. R.J. Reynold
Tobacco, No. 94-08273 CA-22 (Fla. Cir., Dade County, 2000), where the
jury awarded $145 billion in punitive damages.
was later overturned on appeal.

That award, however,

See Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle,

2003 WL 21180319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., May 21, 2003).

In November

2003, in Alabama v. Exxon Mobile Corp., a jury awarded $11.8 billion
in punitive damages, which was more than 180 times the compensatory
damages (excluding interest) and more than plaintiff had sought.

See

Alabama v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 2003 WL 2448276.
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During the past decade, the Court has issued two opinions setting
out guideposts for determining when punitive damages may be
unconstitutionally excessive.7

In 1996, for the first time, the

Supreme Court invalidated a state court award of punitive damages on
the ground that the amount violated the Due Process Clause.

In BMW of

North America, Inc. v. Gore, it articulated a test for lower courts to
use in evaluating the constitutionality of such awards.9
mandated consideration of three guideposts:

The Court

(1) the degree of the

reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct, (2) the ratio between
the harm to the plaintiff caused by the defendant’s misconduct and the
punitive damages award, and (3) the sanctions imposed or that could be
imposed for comparable misconduct.10

However, in the years that

followed, courts struggled to apply the guideposts in a consistent
manner.11

6

Indeed, as one court noted, “[t]he role of gatekeeper over

. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996);

Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003);
see also Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 61 (1991)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Punitive damages are . . . ripe for
reevaluation.”).
7

. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 575; State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1520.

8

. BMW, 517 U.S. at 583.

9

. See id. at 559.

10

. Id. at 575–85.

11

. See, e.g., Inter Med. Supplies, Ltd. v. EBI Med. Sys., Inc.,

181 F.3d 446, 450 (3d Cir. 1999); See also Colleen P. Murphy, Judgment

[sizeable] punitive damages verdicts is one of the most challenging
that has been placed upon appellate judges in civil cases.”12
As a result, in 2003, the Court attempted to clarify the test in
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell.13

Much of the

Court’s focus in that case was on the first two guideposts, the degree
of reprehensibility and the ratio between compensatory and punitive
damages.

Significantly, the Court announced that with respect to the

as a Matter of Law on Punitive Damages, 75 Tul. L. Rev. 459, 478
(2000) (noting that recent cases regarding punitive damages awards
make it “difficult to draw any meaningful line between
unconstitutionally excessive awards and merely unreasonable ones”); E.
Burton Spence, Punitive Damages in Alabama after BMW v. Gore: Are
Outcomes Any More Predictable?, 59 Ala. Law. 314, 315–19 (Sept. 1998)
(discussing disparate appellate punitive damages review in Alabama
after BMW); Note, Christine D’Ambrosia, Punitive Damages in Light of
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore: A Cry for State Sovereignty, 5
J.L. & Pol’y 577, 600–21 (1997) (surveying cases after BMW); Note,
Peter J. Sajevic, Failing the Smell Test: Punitive Damage Awards Raise
the United States Supreme Court’s Suspicious Judicial Eyebrow in BMW
of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 20 Hamline L. Rev. 507, 536–49 (1996)
(discussing BMW guideposts and noting, “the Court’s current role in
the punitive damage arena [is] murky and vague”).

For a further

discussion of lower courts interpretations of the BMW guidelines, see
infra sections IV and V.
12

. Inter Med. Supplies, Ltd., 181 F.3d at 450.

13

. See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1513.
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second guidepost, “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between
punitive and compensatory damages . . . will satisfy due process.”14
Unfortunately, State Farm failed to provide courts with a clear set of
directions on how to apply the three guideposts.

The first guidepost,

concerning reprehensibility, remains amorphous.

Because the Court did

not provide a clear set of criteria to determine whether a defendant’s
conduct justifies a certain amount of punitive damages, applying this
guidepost is highly subjective and can lead to inconsistent decisions.
Similarly, the second guidepost is likely to lead to inconsistent
results because it is easy to manipulate the ratio.15 The third
guidepost remains shrouded in fog.

Indeed, State Farm appears to

obfuscate the purpose of the third guidepost and potentially undercut
its usefulness, by stating that this guidepost has “less utility” than
the others in determining whether a punitive damages award violates
substantive due process.16

Some have erroneously interpreted the

Court’s discussion of the third guidepost to preclude any comparison
of punitive damages awards with criminal penalties on the ground that
civil proceedings lack the protections afforded in criminal
prosecutions.17

14

15

. See id. at 1524.

See infra notes 176-181 and accompanying text.
16

. See id. at 1519.

17

. See, e.g., Cynthia T. Andreason, State Farm v. Campbell: What

Happens Next?, 71 U.S.L.W. (BNA) 2691, 2692 (May 5, 2003) (“[T]he
Campbell Court drastically curtailed consideration of potential
criminal penalties on the ground that cases in which punitive damages

We believe that the third guidepost, properly understood, is the
guidepost best able to bring clarity to the BMW/State Farm test.

We

propose that courts apply the third guidepost by focusing on
comparable criminal (or civil) legislative fines and view any such
penalties as a “presumptive limit” on punitive damages awards.

In

other words, the highest comparable fine should be the presumptive
limit on the punitive damages award.

If the award provided by the

jury is smaller than this presumptive limit, the third guidepost
presents no bar to the imposition of the award.

However, the punitive

damages award must still survive the scrutiny of the first two
guideposts before it can pass constitutional muster.

Nevertheless,

passing the third guidepost would often suggest a constitutionally
permissible punitive damages award.
If, however, a punitive damages award is larger than the
“presumptive limit,” the third guidepost would not be satisfied.
Failing the third guidepost would be a strong indication, but not a
guarantee, that a punitive damages award is unconstitutionally
excessive.

An award that fails the third guidepost and has an

unacceptably large ratio of punitive to compensatory damages would be
unconstitutional in virtually all cases.

If, however, a punitive

damages award fails the third guidepost but has an acceptable ratio
pursuant to the second guidepost, a court should concentrate on the
first guidepost’s reprehensibility inquiry.

Because the relevant

legislature has set a statutory maximum fine for the “presumptive

can be awarded lack the protections that attach to criminal
prosecutions.”).
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limit,” it has indicated its view of the reprehensibility of the
misconduct.

Therefore, it will be difficult to conclude that the

misconduct is so reprehensible as to justify a punitive damages award
greater than the “presumptive limit” set by the legislature. We
believe that this conclusion is appropriate only in cases of
overwhelming reprehensibility in which the conduct is outside all
bounds of decency.
In Part II, we begin by providing an overview of punitive
damages, including tracing the history and purpose of punitive damages
and discussing their availability.
Court’s punitive damages cases.

Part III examines the Supreme

It finds that in less than a decade,

the Court has gone from imposing no constitutional restrictions on the
awarding of punitive damages to providing both procedural and
substantive due process limits on the awarding of punitive damages.
In Part IV, we analyze the third guidepost and determine that the
Court’s decisions in BMW and State Farm fail to articulate either a
coherent rationale or a workable approach for applying this factor.
Part V details a new approach for evaluating whether a punitive
damages award violates due process that focuses on and thus refines
the third guidepost.

Our approach is consistent with the Court’s

views on the subject, satisfies the due process need for notice, is
respectful of federalism concerns, and allows for greater
proportionality and nuance while evaluating punitive damages awards.
Most importantly, it should be easy to apply and should result in more
uniform decisions, thus providing considerable assistance to a
perplexed judiciary.

Part VI offers a brief conclusion.

II.

From Footpath to the Yellow Brick Road: Surveying Punitive
Damages

Punitive damages are “sums awarded apart from any compensatory or
nominal damages, usually . . . because of particularly aggravated
misconduct on the part of the defendant.”18

They are of ancient origin

and are authorized in the documents of many cultures, including the
Code of Hammurabi,19 the Bible,20 the laws of the Babylonians, the
Hittites and ancient Greeks21 and the Hindu Code of Manu.22

18

. Dan B. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies 204 (1973)

(citing Restatement of Torts § 908 (1939)).

See also Charles T.

McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages 275 (1935).
damages are a form of punitive damages.

Multiple

The authority to award

multiple damages is typically set forth in a statute and they are
calculated by multiplying the amount of the compensatory damages by a
designated number.

Unlike the traditional form of punitive damages,

multiple damages have a fixed limit and do not hinge on the
defendant's wealth. See Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies 453–54 (2d ed.
1993).

The most common form of multiple damages is treble damages,

which is calculated by multiplying the compensatory damages by three.
See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
605, 635–36 (1985).

Some courts allow recovery of both multiple

damages and common law punitive damages.

Compare Com-Tech Assoc. v.

Computer Assoc. Int’l, 753 F. Supp. 1078, 1079 (E.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d,
938 F.2d 1574 (1991) (holding that claim for punitive damages could be
asserted in civil action under RICO, even though treble damages are
available) with Standard Chlorine of Del., Inc. v. Sinibaldi, 821 F.

8

The most generally accepted reasons for punitive damages are to
punish and deter certain conduct,23 particularly willful or malicious
conduct.24

Courts and commentators have asserted that these damages

Supp. 232, 252–53 (D. Del. 1992) (holding that punitive damages are
not proper under RICO, since statute already provides treble damages).
19

. Code of Hammurabi § 8, reprinted in 1 Albert Kocourek & John

Wigmore, Sources of Ancient and Primitive Law 391 (1915).
20

. See Exodus 22:1, 9 (King James).

21

. See H.F. Jolowicz, The Assessment of Penalties in Primitive

Law, in Cambridge Legal Essays 205–06 (1926).
22

. See The Laws of Manu in 1 Albert Kocourek & John Wigmore,

supra note 16, at 391.

See also Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,

499 U.S. 1, 25 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (providing history of
punitive damages).
the Torah.

Examples of punitive damages can also be found in

See Elliot Klayman & Seth Klayman, Punitive Damages:

Toward Torah-Based Reform, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 221, 226–40 (2001).
23

. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 54 (1983) (“Punitive damages

are awarded . . . ‘to punish [the defendant] for his outrageous
conduct and to deter others like him from similar conduct in the
future.’ ” (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(1) (1979));
see also 1 Linda J. Schlueter & Kenneth R. Redden, Punitive Damages

§

2.2(A)(1) (4th ed. 2000) (“The most frequently stated purpose of
punitive damages is to punish the defendant for his wrongdoing and to
deter him and others from similar misconduct.”).
24

. See Jane Mallor & Barry Roberts, Punitive Damages: Towards a

Principled Approach, 31 Hastings L.J. 639, 648 (1980); see also David

also serve other functions.25

Specifically, they “vent the indignation

of the victimized,”26 discourage the injured party from engaging in
self-help remedies,27 and compensate victims for otherwise
uncompensable losses,28 including litigation expenses that are not
otherwise recoverable.29

G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform,
39 Vill L. Rev. 363, 373–74 (1994).
25

. See e.g., Robert A. Klinick, Symposium: Reforming Punitive

Damages—The Punitive Damages Debate, 38 Harv. J. on Legis. 469, 470–71
(2001); Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of
Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 Am. U. L.
Rev. 1269, 1320–21 (1993); Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in
the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 3–9 (1982); [author, if

available], Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 Harv. L.
Rev. 517, 520 (1957); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S.
1, 61 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman
Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 437–8 n.11 (2001); see also Anthony J.
Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do?

Why Misunderstanding the History

of Punitive Damages Matters Today, 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 163 (2003).
26

. See Michael Rustad, supra note 22 at 1320-1321. & Thomas

Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards:
Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1269, 1320–21 (1993).
27

. See Dorsey D. Ellis, supra note 22, at 3-9.Jr., Fairness and

Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 3–9 (1982).
28

. See Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, supra note

22, at 520; Sebok, supra note 22.70 Harv. L. Rev. 517, 520 (1957);
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The authority to award punitive damages is governed both by state
and federal law.30

Most states allow punitive damages,31 although the

circumstances under which such relief may be awarded varies greatly.32

Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 61 (1991) (O’Connor,
J., dissenting); Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532
U.S. 424, 437–8 n.11 (2001); see also Anthony J. Sebok, What Did
Punitive Damages Do?

Why Misunderstanding the History of Punitive

Damages Matters Today, 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 163 (2003).
29

. Ellis, supra note 264, at 3.

30

. See generally John J.Kircher & Christine M. Wiseman, Punitive

Damages Law & Practice § 4.01 (2d ed. 2000).
31

. The following states permit awards of punitive damages:

Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota,

Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,

Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.

See Blatt et al.,

supra note

2, at § 8.
32

5.31.

. See generally 1 Kircher & Wiseman, supra note 27, at §§ 5.15–
A handful of states either prohibit awards of punitive damages

altogether, or restrict their use severely.

For example, Nebraska and

Washington do not allow punitive damage awards.

See Miller v.

Kingsley, 230 N.W.2d 472 (Neb. 1975); Maki v. Aluminum Bldg. Prod.,
436 P.2d 186 (Wash.1968).

Louisiana and Massachusetts only allow

Punitive damages have been permitted in actions involving torts,
contracts, property, admiralty, employment, and family law.33
On the federal level, a number of statutes authorize the award of
punitive relief for specific violations.34

The Fair Credit Reporting

punitive damages when they are expressly authorized by statute.

See

McCoy v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 143 So. 383 (La. 1932), cert.
denied, 287 U.S. 661 (1932); Karavokiros v. Indiana Motor Bus Co., 524
F. Supp. 385 (ED La. 1981); USM Corp. v. Marson Fastener Corp., 467
N.E.2d 1271, 1284 (Mass. 1984).
33

. See 1 Schlueter & Redden, supra note 20, at

409–742

(discussing punitive damages in property and tort actions); 2
Schlueter & Redden, supra note 20, at 1–184 (discussing punitive
damages in actions involving admiralty, employment, and family law).
34

. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b) (1994)

(“Any creditor . . . who fails to comply with any requirement imposed
under this subchapter shall be liable to the aggrieved applicant for
punitive damages in an amount not greater than $10,000 . . . .”); Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (1994) (“The court may award to the
plaintiff actual and punitive damages . . . .”); see also Chrysler
Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne Co., 670 F.2d 575, 581–82 (5th Cir.
1982) (holding that treble damages are available if plaintiff can
prove violation of the antitrust laws, cognizable injury caused by
violation, and approximate amount of damage caused by violation),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 908 (1982); Riley v. Empire Airlines, 823 F.
Supp. 1016, 1023

(N.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding punitive damages available

in action for wrongful discharge under Railway Labor Act on showing of

12

Act, for example, provides that a court may award punitive damages
when a consumer reporting agency willfully fails to comply with the
requirements imposed by the Act.35

In addition, various other

statutes, such as the Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”)36 and the False Claims Act,37

deliberate and malicious conduct by employer intended to curb union
activity); Woods v. New Jersey Dep’t of Educ., 796 F. Supp. 767, 776
(D.N.J. 1992) (ruling that language in Individual with Disabilities
Education Act permitting court to “grant such relief as [it]
determines appropriate” authorizes claim for punitive damages in suit
alleging that school board wrongfully denied residential placement of
disabled student).

Conversely, a number of federal statutes expressly

preclude awards of punitive damages.

See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28

U.S.C. § 2674 (1994) (“The United States shall be liable, respecting
the provisions of this title to tort claims, in the same manner and to
the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but
shall not be liable . . . for punitive damages.”); Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1994) (stating that “a foreign state
except for an agency or instrumentality thereof shall not be liable
for punitive damages”).
35

. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (1994).

36

. See Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and

Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3)(1994) (imposing treble damages
for failing to properly provide removal or remedial action upon
release or threat of release of hazardous substance).
37

. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (1994).

provide for the recovery of treble damages.38

However, some statutes

that provide for the awarding of treble damages have been viewed as
remedial in nature.39
With respect to determining the amount of punitive damages, the
practice has been to give the jury broad discretion.40

Under the

traditional approach, once a jury determines that the conduct

38

. See supra note 15 (discussing treble and multiple damages).

39

. See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1994) (providing for

treble damages for injury to one’s business or property by reason of
violation of antitrust laws); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994) (awarding treble damages
for injury to one’s business or property resulting from RICO
violations); see also Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc., 429
U.S. 477,

(1977) (stating that Clayton Act’s treble damages

provision is in essence remedial); Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 537 U.S. 79,

(2002) (characterizing RICO’s treble damages

provision as remedial in nature).
40

. See Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 521 (1885)

(stating that, with respect to determining the amount of punitive
damages, “[t]he discretion of the jury in such cases is not controlled
by any very definite rules; yet the wisdom of allowing such additional
damages to be given is attested by the long continuance of the
practice”); see also Cass R. Sunstein et al., Punitive Damages: How
Juries Decide 3 (2002) (finding that “the instructions presented to
jurors for determination of the appropriate punitive damages verdict
are extremely vague and employ terms that are largely undefined”).

14

justifies an award of punitive damages, it determines the amount,
“consider[ing] the gravity of wrong and the need to deter similar
conduct.”41

That determination is then reviewed by the trial judge and

appellate courts.42

41

. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991).

Commentators also note that some states permit juries to consider, in
determining the amount of punitive damages awarded: (1) the
possibility of criminal punishment, (2) the amount of compensatory
damages, and (3) the expense and attorneys’ fees incurred by the
plaintiff.

See 1 Kircher & Wiseman, supra note 27, § 5:23, at 5-175-

77.
42

. A number of states limit the amount of punitive damages that

may be awarded.

See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 34-51-3-4 (1999) (stating

that punitive damages may not be more than three times compensatory
damages or $50,000, whichever is greater); Tex. Civ. Prac & Rem. Code
Ann. §41.008 (2001) (limiting punitive damages in certain actions to
$200,000 or two times the economic damages plus up to $750,000 in
additional non-economic damages, whichever is greater); Va. Code Ann.
§ 8.01-38.1 (1987)

(imposing $350,000 cap on punitive damages); see

also Nev. Rev. Stat. § 42.005(1) (1991) (limiting punitive damages, in
certain cases, to three times amount of compensatory damages if
compensatory damages are less than $100,000).

For example, Alabama

and Georgia place a specific dollar cap on all awards of punitive
damages at $250,000.

See Ala. Code § 6-11-21 (1975); Ga. Code Ann. §

51-12-5.1(g) (1997).

New Jersey limits punitive damages to five times

III.

Punitive Damages and the Constitution: Leaving Cruise Control to
Steer the Ultimate Driving Machine

For over 200 years, the Supreme Court declined to place any
constitutional limits on jury-awards of punitive damages.43

The Court

based this hands-off policy on the historical recognition of punitive
damages as falling within the discretionary province of common law
courts in the United States and England.44
The first modern case to note that the Constitution may limit
excessive awards of punitive damages was Browning-Ferris Industries of

compensatory damages or $350,000, whichever is greater. See N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2A: 15-5.14 (1995).
43

. See, e.g., St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. Williams, 251

U.S. 63,

(1919) (affirming award of $75 punitive damages and $25 in

attorneys’ fees against railroad that collected sixty-six cents more
than normal fare from two passengers ); Beckwith v. Bean, 98 U.S. 266,
305 (1878) (upholding punitive damage award in false imprisonment
action); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363,

(1852) (affirming

punitive damage award against defendants in trespass action).
44

. See Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 521 (1885)

(“[I]n England and in this country, [damages] have been allowed in
excess of compensation, whenever malice, gross neglect, or oppression
has caused or accompanied the commission of the injury complained
of.”); Day, 54 U.S. at 371 (“It is a well-established principle of the
common law, that in actions of trespass and all actions on the case
for torts, a jury may inflict what are called exemplary, punitive, or
vindictive damages upon a defendant . . . .”).

16

Vermont v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.45

In Browning-Ferris, a jury awarded

$51,146 in compensatory damages and $6 million in punitive damages
against a defendant whose predatory pricing campaign violated the
Sherman Act46 and state tort law.47

The defendant argued that the

punitive damages award violated the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment.48

The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that the

clause applied only to government actions, particularly criminal

45

. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).

See also Williams, 251 U.S. at 66–67

(noting that states are permitted wide latitude in discretion but due
process limits excessive awards); Standard Oil Co. of Ind. v.
Missouri, 224 U.S. 270, 286 (1911) (upholding contested penalty award
and noting that court’s discretion was limited to its obligation of
administering justice); Seaboard Airline Ry. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73,
76 (1907) (finding that there must be substantial foundation and basis
for punitive damage awards).
46

. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1997).

47

. See generally Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 261–62.

Browning-

Ferris (BFI) was the sole provider of trash-collection services in
Burlington, Vermont, until Jacob Kelley, a former BFI district
manager, started Kelco Disposal.

Id. at 261.

BFI attempted to force

Kelco out of business by reducing prices by over 40%.

Id.

BFI’s

regional vice president ordered BFI to “[s]quish [Kelley] like a bug.”
Id.
48

. U.S. Const. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be

required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.”).

prosecutions and punishments.49

The Supreme Court did not address the

question whether the punitive damages award violated the Due Process
Clause50 because the issue was not properly preserved.51

However, the

Court left the door open, noting:

There is some authority in our opinions for the view
that the Due Process Clause places outer limits on the
size of a civil damages award made pursuant to a
statutory scheme . . . but we have never addressed the
precise question presented here: whether due process
acts as a check on undue jury discretion to award

49

. See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 262, 266.

The Court found

that the Eighth Amendment only applies to government actions, and
therefore does not limit damage awards in private civil cases.
id. at 260.

See

However, if the damages award goes to the state, even in

a private civil case, the result may well be different.

See infra

note 231.
50

. U.S. Const. amend. XIV (“No State shall make or enforce any

law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
51

. See id.

BFI did not raise the due process issue in its

petition for certiorari and did not assert that the award violated due
process before either the district court or the court of appeals.
at 277.

Id.

Nor did it claim that the jury was biased or the procedures

were fundamentally unfair.

Id. at 276.
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punitive damages in the absence of any express statutory
limit. . . . That inquiry must await another day.52

That day came two years later in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Co., v. Haslip.53

In that case, Cleopatra Haslip sued Pacific Mutual

Life Insurance Company and one of its employees, claiming that the
employee misappropriated her health insurance payments, resulting in
the termination of her policy, and that the company was liable for

52

. Id. at 276–77 (citations omitted).

See also id. at 280

(Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring) (emphasizing that Court’s
decision “leaves the door open for a holding that the Due Process
Clause constrains the imposition of punitive damages in civil cases
brought by private parties”).

Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice

Stevens, concurred in part and dissented in part.

Justice O’Connor

argued that punitive damage awards should be restricted by the Eighth
Amendment Excessive Fines Clause.

Id. at 297–98 (O’Connor, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part).

She recommended remanding

the case, so the lower court could conduct a proportionality analysis
under the following guidelines: (1) “accord ‘substantial deference’ to
the legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the
conduct at issue,” (2) “examine the gravity of the defendant’s conduct
and the harshness of the award,” and (3) “compare the civil and
criminal penalties imposed in the same jurisdiction for different
types of conduct, and the civil and criminal penalties imposed by
different jurisdictions for the same or similar conduct.”

Id. at 300–

01 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
53

. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).

damages under the theory of respondeat superior.54

Haslip sought

$200,000 in compensatory damages and $3 million in punitive damages.55
A jury awarded Haslip a total of $1,040,000, of which $840,000 was
presumably punitive damages.56

The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the

award, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the
propriety of the punitive damages award.57
The Court began by noting that the common law method for
assessing punitive damages allows the award to be determined by a jury
and then reviewed by trial and appellate courts to ensure that it is
reasonable.

The Court declared that this method was not “so

inherently unfair as to deny due process and be per se

54

. See id. at 4–7.

Because her health insurance policy was

cancelled, Haslip was unable to pay for hospital and physician charges
that she incurred.

This resulted in a collection agency obtaining a

judgment against her, which adversely affected her credit rating.
Three other parties also filed suit against the defendants, claiming
that their policies had been improperly terminated.
55

. See id. at 7 n.2.

56

. See id.

Id. at 5.

The jury also awarded the other plaintiffs

approximately $38,000.

Id. at 7.

That award was not at issue before

the Supreme Court.
57

. See id. at 7–8.

Pacific Mutual lost on appeal to the Supreme

Court of Alabama, with two judges dissenting on the ground that the
excessive damages violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.

Id. at 7.
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unconstitutional.”58

However, the Court noted that unlimited jury or

judicial discretion in determining the amount of punitive damages “may
invite extreme results that jar one’s constitutional sensibilities.”59
Nevertheless, the Court declined to set forth a bright line
mathematical test for determining whether awards of punitive damages
were unconstitutionally excessive.60

Instead, it focused on whether

the state’s procedures for determining and reviewing punitive damage

58

. Id. at 17.

The Court noted that it, as well as every other

state and federal court that had considered the issue, had upheld the
common-law method by assessing punitive damages.

Id.

The Court

stated, “If a thing is practiced for two hundred years by the common
consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to
affect it.”
730 (1988)).

Id. at 17 (quoting Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717,
The Court observed, however, that it would be

inappropriate to say that all punitive damage awards are
constitutional solely because they have been practiced for many years.
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18.

Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, but

disagreed with this reasoning.

He stated: “Since it has been the

traditional practice of American courts to leave punitive damages . .
. to the discretion of the jury . . . I would approve the procedure
challenged here without further inquiry into its ‘fairness’ or
‘reasonableness.’”
59

. Id. at 18.

60

. See id.

Id. at 24–25.

The Court noted that the four to one ratio of

punitive to compensatory damages “may be close to the line” between
constitutional and unconstitutional awards.

Id. at 23–24.

awards satisfied due process.61

The Court concluded that the jury

instructions on punitive damages placed reasonable constraints on the
jury’s discretion and that Alabama’s post-trial procedures for
reviewing punitive damage awards were reasonable.62

61

. See id. at 19.

62

. See id. at 19.

The Court found that, although the jury had

significant discretion in determining the amount of the award, the
instructions confined the award to the well-recognized dual goals of
punitive damages, deterrence and retribution, therefore satisfying the
procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause.

Id.

Professors Polinsky and Shavell define general deterrence as “the
effect that the prospect of having to pay damages will have on the
behavior of similarly situated parties in the future (and not just on
the party at hand).”

A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive

Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 869, 877 (1998).
Retribution “is the right that the magistrate has to inflict pain on a
subject in consequence of his having committed a crime.”

Immanuel

Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice 99 (1965) (discussing the
right to punish).

Some commentators argue that a retribution-based

punitive damage award theory is unsatisfactory in most instances,
especially when the defendant is a corporation.
Shavell, supra, at 906.

See Polinsky &

However, federal and state courts generally

accept these dual goals as valid.

See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19 (noting

that “punitive damages are imposed for the purposes of deterrence and
retribution”); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell,
123 S. Ct. 1513, 1519 (2003) (explaining that punitive damages, unlike

22

The Court also addressed the amount of the award, noting that it
was greater than four times the compensatory damages, more than 200
times Haslip’s out-of-pocket expenses, and well in excess of the fine
that could be imposed under state law for insurance fraud.63

The Court

ruled that, “while the monetary comparisons are wide, . . . [the
punitive damages did] not cross the line into an area of
constitutional impropriety.”64
Justice O’Connor dissented.

She argued that in recent years

there had been an explosion in the frequency and size of awards of
punitive damages and that the time had come to reassess the
constitutionality of the practice.65

Due process, she asserted,

compensatory damages, are aimed at deterrence and retribution); Cooper
Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001)
(noting that punitive damages “operate as ‘private fines,’ intended to
punish the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing”).
63

. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23.

64

. Id. at 23–24.

The Court also found Pacific Mutual liable for

the punitive damage award via respondeat superior under Alabama law
and rejected Pacific-Mutual’s argument that the Court should raise the
burden of persuasion above the currently used “preponderance of the
evidence” standard.
65

Id. at 18–19, 23.

. See id. at 62.

Justice O’Connor further noted:

Punitive damages are . . . ripe for reevaluation.

In

the past, such awards ‘merited scant attention’ because
they were ‘rarely assessed and likely to be small in

“demands that we possess some degree of confidence that the procedures
employed to deprive persons of life, liberty, and property are capable
of producing fair and reasonable results.”66

In Justice O’Connor’s

view, Alabama’s procedures were insufficient to constrain the
discretion of juries in deciding both whether to award punitive
damages and the amount of such awards.67

amount.’

When awarded, they were reserved for the most

reprehensible, outrageous or insulting acts.

Even then,

they came at a time when compensatory damages were not
available for pain, humiliation, and other forms of
intangible injury.

Punitive damages filled this gap.

Recent years, however, have witnessed an explosion in
the frequency and size of punitive damage awards.

Id. at 61 (citations omitted).
66

. Id. at 63.

67

. See id. For a discussion of Haslip, see David F. Cutter, Note,

TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.: A Failure to Create
True Constitutional Protection Against Excessive Punitive Damages, 44
Cath. U. L. Rev. 631, 651 (1995) (“Haslip clearly established that
there were due process limits to punitive damages” and “established a
framework for determining whether an award satisfied the requirements
of due process.”);

Janice Kemp, The Continuing Appeal of Punitive

Damages: An Analysis of Constitutional and Other Challenges to
Punitive Damages, Post-Haslip and Moriel, 26 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1, 13
(1995) (noting that “the Haslip impact has been more of a whisper than
a bang”); Elizabeth H. Sperow, Note, Constitutional Law: TXO
24

Not long thereafter, the Court again considered whether a large
punitive damages award violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Corp,68

In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources

TXO filed suit contesting Alliance’s title to an oil and gas

interest, and Alliance counterclaimed for slander of title.69

The jury

Production Corporation v. Alliance Resources Corporation Ruling Leaves
Defendants Who Assert Due Process Challenges to Punitive Damage Awards
Still Searching for a Compass, 47 Okla. L. Rev. 335, 355 (1994)
(interpreting Haslip as “a justification for deferential review rather
than any meaningful precedent”).

One year after Haslip, few state

courts changed their laws governing and reviewing punitive damage
awards.

See Sarah Stevens & Harry Lempert, One Year After Haslip,

State Systems for Awards Mostly Upheld, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
347 (Mar. 13, 1993).
68

. 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (plurality opinion).

69

. See id. at 447.

TXO wanted to obtain the rights to develop

oil and gas on property controlled by Alliance.

Id.

TXO contracted

with Alliance to develop these rights, and Alliance agreed to return
the consideration paid if title failed.

Id. at 477–78.

Following

the execution of a contract between the parties, TXO’s attorneys
discovered an earlier deed purporting to transfer the mineral rights
to a third party.

Id. at 448.

However, further investigation by TXO

revealed that the earlier deed only involved coal rights, and did not
affect the title given to it by Alliance.

Id.

Despite these

findings, TXO purchased a quitclaim deed from the current owner of the
coal rights and unsuccessfully tried to persuade the original deed’s

returned a verdict for Alliance, awarding it $19,000 in compensatory
and $10 million in punitive damages.70

The Supreme Court of Appeals of

West Virginia affirmed.71
A divided Supreme Court upheld the award.

As in Haslip, the

plurality72 in TXO declined to formulate a mathematical bright line
between constitutionally acceptable and unacceptable awards of
punitive damages.73

It noted, however, that “a general concern of

reasonableness . . . properly enters into the constitutional
calculus.”74

The plurality determined that, although the punitive

damages were 526 times the amount of the compensatory damages awarded

grantee to execute a false affidavit saying that the earlier deed
included the oil and gas rights.

Id. at 449–50.

TXO then contacted

Alliance, questioning their title, and tried to renegotiate the
contract.

Id. at 449.

negotiations failed.
70

TXO filed for a declaratory judgment after

Id.

. See id. at 446.

The $19,000 compensatory award was based on

Alliance’s costs of defending TXO’s frivolous lawsuit.

Id. at 451.

71

. See id. at 452.

72

. Justice Stevens wrote for the plurality; he was joined by

Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun.

Justice Kennedy

concurred in part and concurred in the judgment.
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment.

Justice Scalia and

Justice O’Connor, Justice

White and Justice Souter dissented.
73

. See id. at 458.

74

. Id. (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 2,

18 (1991)).

26

to Alliance, the damages did not violate substantive due process.75
The plurality recognized that due process imposed substantive limits
to damage awards, but that jury-awarded punitive damages deserved a
strong presumption of validity.76

The plurality concluded that the

punitive damage award was reasonable based on TXO’s malicious conduct
and the potential for harm had their plan succeeded.77

75

. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 459, 462.

76

. See id. at 454–55, 457.

77

. See id. at 461.

TXO additionally argued that its financial

resources should not have been included as a factor to determine the
amount of the punitive damages award.

Id. at 463 n.28.

The plurality

disagreed, noting that using the defendant’s wealth to determine the
appropriate amount of a punitive damages award is both historically
accepted and constitutional under Haslip.

Id.

TXO also argued that the award violated procedural due process
because the jury was not adequately instructed, the appellate review
was deficient, and TXO had no notice that the award would be so large
or that the jury would use TXO’s wealth to determine the award.
at 462–63.

Id.

The plurality declined to address the first argument

because it was not properly preserved.

Id. at 463.

It then dismissed

TXO’s other due process arguments, ruling that the procedures used
satisfied the standards set forth in Haslip.

Id. at 462–66.

Justice O’Connor again dissented.78

She argued that the Court

should focus on three objective criteria for determining the
constitutionality of punitive damages awards: the ratio of punitive
damages to compensatory damages, previous similar damage awards
rendered in the same and other jurisdictions, and legislatively
designated penalties for similar misconduct.79

Justice O’Connor argued

that by assessing a punitive damages award using these factors, a
court can generally determine whether an award is constitutional.80
One year later, the Supreme Court broke with past practice and
reversed a punitive damages award on the ground that the procedures
for reviewing that award violated the Due Process Clause.

In Honda

Motor Co. v. Oberg,81 Oberg sued Honda after his three-wheeled allterrain vehicle flipped, permanently injuring him.82

The jury awarded

Oberg $919,390.30 in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive

78

. Justice O’Connor’s dissent was joined by Justice White and, in

certain parts, by Justice Souter.

Id. at 472 (O’Connor, J.,

dissenting).
79

. See id. at 481.

Justice O’Connor also mentioned these three

factors in her opinion in Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont v. Kelco
Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 297–98 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
80

. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 481 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

81

. 512 U.S. 415 (1994).

82

. See id. at 418.

His suit alleged that Honda knew or should

have known that the vehicle’s three-wheeler design was unreasonably
dangerous.

Id.

28

damages.83

The Oregon Court of Appeals and Oregon Supreme Court upheld

the award, based on an Oregon statute that prohibited judicial review
of the amount of punitive damages awarded by a jury unless there was
no evidence to support the verdict.84
The United States Supreme Court began its opinion by recognizing
that “an award may be so excessive as to violate due process.”85
Nevertheless, it declined to address whether the punitive damages
award against Honda was unconstitutionally excessive.86

Instead, the

Court focused on whether Oregon’s procedures for reviewing punitive
damages awards ensured that they were not imposed by juries in an
arbitrary manner.87

The Court held that Oregon’s failure to provide

defendants with a meaningful way to obtain postverdict judicial review
of the amount of a punitive damages award violated the Due Process

83

. See id.

Because Oberg was 20% at fault, the compensatory

damages were reduced to $735,512.31.
84

Id.

. See id. at 418–19 (quoting Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 316 Ore.

263, 285 [please cite to the regional reporter – 851 P2d] (1992)).
Oregon allowed judicial review if a punitive damage award was appealed
based on improper jury instructions, trial error, or if there was no
evidence to support any punitive damages award.
427.
85

. Id. at 420.

86

. See id.

87

. See id.

Oberg, 512 U.S. at

Clause, because there was no protection against arbitrary and
inaccurate adjudications that deprive a party of liberty or property.88
The Court overturned a jury award of punitive damages on the
ground that it was grossly excessive and exceeded constitutional

88

. See id. at 420, 432.

Rehnquist dissented.

Justice Ginsburg and Chief Justice

Id. at 436–451.

Commentators disagreed on the effect of the Oberg decision.
Compare Kemp, supra note 64, at 22–23 (noting that “perhaps Oberg will
be reviewed narrowly and thus have little practical effect”); with
Mark. A. Klugheit, “Where the Rubber Meets the Road”: Theoretical
Justifications vs. Practical Outcomes in Punitive Damages Litigation,
52 Syracuse L. Rev. 803, 820 (2002) (stating that Oberg “offered no
parameters for determining the legitimacy of particular punitive
damages awards”).

Many asserted that, after deciding three cases in

less than four years, the Supreme Court still had not provided clear
guidelines for states to determine if a punitive damage award was
constitutional. See e.g., Son B. Nguyen, Note, BMW of North America v.
Gore: Elevating Reasonableness in Punitive Damages to a Doctrine of
Substantive Due Process, 57 Md. L. Rev. 251, 260 (1998) (noting that
“[b}ecause the Oberg Court based its ruling on procedural grounds, the
question of whether due process imposed a substantive limit on the
size of punitive damages remained unanswered”); E. Benjamin Alliker,
Punitive Damage Awards After Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg: Analyzing the
Triumverate of History, Due Process and the Jury, 6 Md. J. Contemp.
Legal Issues 377, 397 (1995) (stating that Oberg “increased confusion
regarding punitive damages reform”).
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limits for the first time in BMW of North America Inc., v. Gore.89 In
that case, Gore alleged that BMW committed fraud under Alabama law by
failing to disclose that the new car that he purchased from an
authorized dealer had been damaged and repainted prior to its sale.90
A jury awarded Gore $4,000 in compensatory damages91 and $4 million in
punitive damages, finding that BMW’s actions constituted gross,
oppressive or malicious fraud.92

89

. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).

90

. See id. at 563.

BMW appealed.93

Although the Alabama

The Alabama statute provided: “Suppression of

a material fact which the party is under an obligation to communicate
constitutes fraud.

The obligation to communicate may arise from the

confidential relations of the parties or from the particular
circumstances of the case.”

Id. at 563 n.3 (quoting Ala. Code § 6-5-

102 (1993)).
The damage to Gore’s car only amounted to $601.37, approximately
1.5% of its list price.

BMW, 517 U.S. at 564.

BMW admitted that it

did not disclose the second paint job, based on a nationwide policy of
suppressing details of repairs when the damage was less than 3% of the
car’s suggested retail price.

Id. at 563–64.

This practice was

permitted by statute in 25 states, but not in Alabama.

Id. at 565.

BMW’s non-disclosure policy had never been deemed unlawful before Gore
filed suit.
91

Id.

. See id. at 564–65.

Gore’s actual damages were based on the

statements of a former BMW dealer, who testified that the second paint
job decreased the value of the BMW by 10%.
92

. See id. at 565.

Id. at 564.

Supreme Court rejected BMW’s claim that the award was
unconstitutionally excessive,94 it reduced the punitive damages to $2
million, ruling that the jury improperly calculated the award by
basing it on BMW’s conduct in other states.95

The United States

Supreme Court reversed.96
The Court initially noted that a state may impose punitive
damages to further its “legitimate interests in punishing unlawful
conduct and deterring its repetition.”97

As a result, the Court stated

that the inquiry to determine whether a punitive damages award is
unconstitutionally excessive begins with identifying the interests
that a punitive damages award is designed to serve.98

The Court

determined that while Alabama had a legitimate interest in awarding

93

. See id.

BMW asserted that evidence of its lawful conduct in

other states wrongfully influenced the award and that punitive damages
would serve no deterrent purpose because it had already repealed the
non-disclosure policy.
94

. See id. at 566.

Id. at 565–66.
The Alabama Supreme Court analyzed the award

based on the factors set forth in Haslip.

Id. at 567.

The Alabama

court noted that BMW acted reprehensibly, profited from its fraudulent
behavior, was not subject to any criminal sanctions, and that only a
large award could properly deter a large company like BMW.

Id. at

567–68.
95

. See id. at 567.

96

. See id. at 585–86.

97

. Id. at 568.

98

. See id.
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punitive damages in this case – preventing manufacturers from engaging
in deceptive trade practices – such damages could only be imposed for
conduct committed within its jurisdiction.99

To impose economic

sanctions for conduct outside the state, the Court held, would
improperly punish BMW for conduct that was possibly lawful in other
jurisdictions and that would have no effect on Alabama.100

The Court

thus agreed with the portion of the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision
that the jury had improperly calculated the amount of punitive damages
because it based its award in large part on BMW’s conduct outside the
state.101
The Court next turned to whether the reduced award was
unconstitutionally excessive.

The Court announced three guideposts to

be used in reviewing punitive damages awards: (1) the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct, (2) the ratio between
compensatory and punitive damages, and (3) the difference between the

99

. See id. at 573.

100

.

See id.

101

.

See id. at 574–75.

While Alabama was permitted to impose

punitive damages to protect its own consumers, the basic tenets of
state sovereignty forbid it to punish a corporation for its lawful
conduct in other jurisdictions.

Id. at 571.

However, BMW’s out-of-

state conduct could be used to determine the degree of
reprehensibility of its conduct.

Id. at 573 n.20.

punitive damages award and the penalties authorized or imposed for
similar conduct.102
The Court noted that the first guidepost, the degree of
reprehensibility, was the most important indicium of reasonableness.103
Applying this factor, the Court determined that BMW’s conduct was not
sufficiently reprehensible to justify a $2 million punitive damages
award.104

The Court explained that the harm to Gore was purely

economic, as opposed to physical, and that there was no evidence of
“deliberate false statements, acts of affirmative misconduct, or
concealment of evidence of improper motive.”105
Turning to the second guidepost, the Court stated that the
punitive damages must bear a reasonable relationship to the actual
harm inflicted on the plaintiff.106

102

.

See id. at 575.

Consistent with Haslip and TXO,

Justice O’Connor had advocated similar

criteria in Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal,
492 U.S. 257, 297–98 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).

She also advocated comparing punitive damages

awards to legislative penalties in TXO Prod. Corp v. Alliance Res.
Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 481 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
103

.

See BMW, 517 U.S. at 575.

104

.

See id. at 580.

105

.

Id. at 579.

The Court noted that conduct causing economic

injury could be extremely reprehensible in some cases, especially when
the defendant is financially vulnerable, but that BMW’s conduct in
this case was not.
106

.

Id. at 579–80.

See id. at 580.
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the Court refused to adopt a simple mathematical formula to determine
the constitutionality of a punitive damages award.107

It stated,

however, that the $2 million punitive damages award against BMW, which
was 500 times the actual harm to Gore, “surely raise[s] a suspicious
judicial eyebrow.”108
The Court then addressed the third guidepost, which compares the
punitive damages award and the sanctions that could be imposed by the
state for comparable misconduct.109

The Court explained that, in

107

.

See id. at 582.

108

.

Id. at 582–83 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res.

Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 481 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).

The Court

distinguished its approval of a 526 to 1 ratio in TXO by noting that
the potential harm was much greater than the actual harm suffered by
Alliance in TXO.

BMW, 517 U.S. at 581.

For a further discussion of

TXO, see supra notes 65–77 and accompanying text.
109

.

See id. at 583.

It should be noted that the majority of

American states allow punitive damages even if the defendant has
already been subject to criminal proceedings for the same conduct.
See 1 Kircher & Wiseman, supra note 27, at § 3:2 (citing cases).
There are two justifications for this rule.

The first is that the

prohibition on double jeopardy applies only to multiple criminal
prosecutions by the same sovereign.

See E.F. Hutton & Co. v.

Anderson, 596 P.2d 413, 415 (Colo. App. 1979); Olson v. Walker, 781
P.2d 1015, 1024 (Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1989).

Civil and criminal

penalties serve different purposes: criminal sanctions redress a wrong
to the public, whereas punitive damages in a civil action redress a

applying this factor, a reviewing court should “accord ‘substantial
deference’ to the legislative judgments concerning appropriate
sanctions for the conduct at issue.”110

In the instant case, the Court

stated, the maximum civil penalty for deceptive trade practices in
Alabama was $2,000 – far less than the $2 million punitive damages
award.111

The Court also noted that “[t]he sanction imposed in this

case cannot be justified on the ground that it was necessary to deter
future misconduct without considering whether less drastic remedies
could be expected to achieve that goal.”112
Based on its application of the three guideposts, the Court
concluded that the award was so grossly excessive that it exceeded the
constitutional limit.113

It thus reversed the Alabama Supreme Court’s

judgment and remanded the case for that court to decide whether to

wrong to a private party.

See Wittman v. Gilson, 520 N.E.2d 514, 515

(N.Y. 1988); Moody v. Payne, 355 So. 2d 1116, 1120 (Ala. 1978).

By

contrast, in some countries, such as Australia and New Zealand,
punitive damages may not be assessed against a defendant if he or she
has already been substantially punished in a criminal proceeding.

See

Gray v. Motor Accident Comm’n (1998) 158 A.L.R. 485; Daniels v.
Thompson, [1998] 3 N.Z.L.R. 22.
110

.

Id. at 583 (quoting Browning Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v.

Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 301 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
111

.

See BMW, 517 U.S. at 584.

112

.

Id.

113

.

See id. at 858–86.
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grant BMW a new trial or to independently determine a constitutionally
appropriate award.114

114

.

See id. at 586.

Justice Breyer, with whom Justices
Id. at 586–

O’Connor and Souter joined, filed a concurring opinion.
87.

Justice Breyer asserted that Alabama’s procedures for awarding

and upholding punitive damage awards were vague, providing few
constraints, and that the Alabama Supreme Court failed to properly
review the award.

Id. at 588.

He then scrutinized the award under
BMW, 517 U.S. at 589–92.

the Alabama standards, approved in Haslip.

Justice Breyer found that BMW did not have adequate notice of the
award and that the award was constitutionally unsound because
Alabama’s standards were unequally applied.

Id. at 587.

Justice

Scalia dissented, rejecting the Court’s finding that the Fourteenth
Amendment provided substantive restraints on punitive damages awards.
Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Justice Ginsburg, joined by

Chief Justice Rehnquist, also dissented.

She argued that the award

should be upheld because the Alabama Supreme Court followed procedures
approved by the United States Supreme Court in Haslip.
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

Id. at 607

In addition, she viewed the majority’s

decision as “unnecessarily and unwisely ventur[ing] into territory
traditionally within the State’s domain . . . .”
Reaction to BMW was mixed.

Id.

Some commentators maintained that BMW

established a consistent test for determining whether an award was
constitutional and ensured fair notice before punitive damage awards
could be assessed.

See, e.g., Nguyen, supra note 85, at 269 (noting

that “BMW Court developed a coherent framework for determining whether

a punitive damages award is within the constitutionally accepted
range”).

Others argued that the three guide posts analyzed in BMW,

reprehensibility, ratio and criminal sanctions, are “far too
subjective and malleable to be meaningful beyond the facts of BMW v.
Gore.”

Neil B. Stekloff, Note and Comment, Raising Five Eyebrows:

Substantive Due Process Review of Punitive Damages Awards After BMW v.
Gore, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 1797, 1817 (1997).

Another commentator averred

that the Court left lower courts with no guidance to decide whether an
award was constitutional.

See Donnie E. Martin, BMW of North America,

Inc. v. Gore: An Explanation of Standards or a Mere Examination of the
Constitutional Boundaries of Punitive Damage Awards, 35 Ct. Rev. 26,
30 (1998) (noting that “the Court has left lower Courts without any
guidance with which to deal with future procedural challenges”).
Notwithstanding these criticisms, lower courts immediately began
applying BMW, reducing some damage awards and upholding others.

See,

e.g., Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2000)
(upholding award because defendant had fair notice and ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages was 1.78 to 1); EEOC v. W&O, Inc.,
213 F.3d 600 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that ratio of 26.3 to 1
satisfied due process); Mathie v. Fries, 121 F.3d 808 (2d Cir. 1997)
(upholding $500,000 award because defendant’s conduct was
reprehensible, 2-1 ratio was not unreasonable, and award was less than
comparable criminal penalties); Watson v. Johnson Mobile Homes, 284
F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2002) (reversing award because Mississippi criminal
statutes imposed smaller penalty than 175 times actual damage).
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Four years after BMW, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
another punitive damage case, Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool
Group, Inc.115

There, Leatherman alleged that Cooper had engaged in

trade dress infringement, unfair competition, and false advertising.116
A jury awarded Leatherman $50,000 in compensatory damages and $4.5
million in punitive damages.117

The district court upheld the award

and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, ruling inter alia that the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the
punitive damages award was constitutional under the BMW test.118

The

Supreme Court reversed.
The Court initially noted that punitive damages are “‘quasicriminal,’ [and] operate as ‘private fines’ intended to punish the
defendant and to deter wrongdoing.”119

It then drew a distinction

between a jury’s assessment of compensatory and punitive damages: the
former is a factual determination while the latter is an expression of
moral condemnation.

Because of the nature of punitive damages, the

115

.

532 U.S. 424 (2001).

116

.

See id. at 427–28.

117

.

See id. at 429.

With respect to the punitive damages

claim, the jury determined that “Leatherman [had] shown by clear and
convincing evidence that by engaging in false advertising or passing
off, Cooper acted with malice, or showed a reckless and outrageous
indifference to a highly unreasonable risk of harm and . . . acted
with a conscious indifference to Leatherman’s rights.”
118

.

See id. at 429–31.

119

.

Id. at 432.

Id.

Court held that the Constitution imposes limits on their imposition,
and that the general criteria to determine whether an award violates
the Due Process Clause are set forth in BMW.120

Whether these

criterion have been met, the Court ruled, must be determined de novo
on appeal.121

Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit erred in applying the

less demanding abuse of discretion standard when it reviewed the
district court’s determination that the award was constitutional.122

120

.

See id. at 432–35.

121

.

See id. at 436.

122

.

See id. at 432–43.

In addition, the Court also stated that

the jury’s award of punitive damages was not a “finding of fact” and,
as a result, a de novo review of that award “does not implicate
Seventh Amendment concerns.”

Id. at 437.

The Court also independently reviewed the district court’s
decision and, after applying the BMW factors, speculated that the
trial court’s decision might not survive de novo review upon remand.
Id. at 441–43.

Applying the first factor, the degree of the

defendant’s misconduct, the Court noted that Cooper’s conduct that
resulted in the award of punitive damages may in fact have been
entirely lawful and hence not reprehensible.

The Court next opined

that the district court may have improperly applied the second BMW
factor, the ratio between compensatory and punitive damages.

With

respect to the third factor, the Court noted:

[R]espondent argues that Cooper would have been subject
to a comparable sanction under Oregon’s Unlawful Trade
Practices Act.

In a suit brought by a State under that
40

The Supreme Court clarified the BMW guideposts last term in State
Farm Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell.123

The case arose after

Curtis Campbell caused a car accident, killing Todd Ospital and
permanently disabling Robert Slusher.124

Ospital’s estate and Slusher

Act, a civil penalty of up to $25,000 per violation may
be assessed.

In respondent’s view, each of the

thousands of pieces of promotional material containing a
picture of PST that Cooper [wrongfully] distributed
warranted the maximum fine.

Petitioner, on the other

hand, argues that its preparation of a single “mock-up”
for use in a single distribution would have been viewed
as a single violation under the state statute.

The

Court of Appeals . . . observe[d] that the unfairness in
Cooper’s use of the picture apparently had nothing to do
with misleading customers but was related to its
inability to obtain a “mock-up” quickly and cheaply.
This observation is more consistent with the singleviolation theory than with the statutory violation would
have been sanctioned with a multimillion dollar fine.

Id. at 443.

While Cooper addressed an important appellate procedural

question, it did little to further the due process issues faced by
trial courts.

See Klugheit, supra note 85, at 837.

123

.

123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).

124

.

See id.

Campbell, while riving with his wife, Inez Preece

Campbell, tried to pass six vans on a two-lane highway.

Id. Todd

Ospital was traveling in the other lane. Ospital swerved to avoid

offered to settle for $50,000, Campbell’s policy limit.125

Although

State Farm knew the accident was Campbell’s fault, it refused to
settle, and the case proceeded to trial.126

The jury found Campbell

entirely at fault and returned a verdict of $185,849.127

State Farm

thereafter refused to pay the difference between the proposed
settlement amount and the jury verdict or to post a supersedeas bond
so that Campbell could appeal the award.128
own counsel and appealed the verdict.129

Campbell then retained his

After the appeal was denied,

State Farm paid the entire judgment.130

colliding with Campbell and, as a result, he lost control of his
vehicle and struck a car driven by Robert G. Slusher.

Id.

While the

Campbells escaped uninjured, Ospital was killed and Slusher was
permanently disabled.

Id.

125

.

See id. at 1518.

126

.

See id.

fault.

Originally, Campbell claimed that he was not at

Id. at 1517.

However, after interviewing witnesses, State

Farm investigators found otherwise and assured the Campbells that
State Farm would represent their best interests.
127

.

See id.

128

.

See id.

Id.

Representatives for State Farm even told the

Campbells to “put for sale signs on your property to get things
moving.”
129

.

Id.
See id.

While the appeal was pending, Campbell entered

into an agreement with Ospital’s estate and Slusher.

Id.

They would

not seek satisfaction of their claims against Campbell in exchange for
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The Campbells then filed suit against State Farm, alleging bad
faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.131
During both portions of the bifurcated trial,132 State Farm attempted
unsuccessfully to suppress evidence relating to its conduct outside of
Utah.133

A jury awarded the Campbells $2.5 million in compensatory

damages and $145 million in punitive damages.134

The trial court then

reduced the award to $1 million in compensatory damages and $25

90% of any verdict Campbell obtained in a bad faith action against
State Farm.

Id.

130

.

See id.

131

.

See id.

State Farm’s motion for summary judgment was

initially granted because they paid the verdict, but was reversed on
appeal.
132

Id.
.

See id.

In the first phase of the trial, the jury found

that State Farm acted unreasonably by not settling.

Id.

In the

second phase, the jury addressed State Farm’s liability for fraud and
intentional infliction of emotional distress and determined the damage
amount.
133

Id.
.

See id. at 1518–19.

The contested evidence included

unrelated cases outside of Utah and State Farm’s Performance, Planning
and Review (PPR) system.

Id. at 1519.

nationwide by State Farm for 20 years.

The PPR had been used
Id.

Most of the PPR was

unrelated to automobile insurance claims like the Campbells’, but did
focus on capping payouts to meet corporate fiscal goals.
19.
134

.

See id. at 1519.

Id. at 1518–

million in punitive damages.135
Supreme Court.136

Both parties appealed to the Utah

After purporting to apply the guidelines set forth

in BMW, that court reinstated the $145 million punitive damages
award.137

The United States Supreme Court reversed.138

The Court began its analysis by stating that grossly excessive
punitive damages violate the Due Process Clause because they further
no legitimate state purpose and constitute an arbitrary deprivation of
property.139

The Court noted that civil awards of punitive damages

should be of particular concern, because, while they serve a similar
purpose as criminal fines, the parties subject to awards of punitive
damages are not accorded the same protections that defendants enjoy in

135

.

See id.

One commentator notes that “the jury, faced with

reams of evidence of ‘bad acts’ on the part of State Farm, simply came
up with a number that would ‘send a message’ or make State Farm ‘stand
accountable for what it’s doing across the country.’” Catherine M.
Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Compensatory Damages, 113 Yale
L. J. *1, *112 (forthcoming 2003).
136

.

See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1519.

137

.

See id.

The court found that State Farm’s conduct was

reprehensible, would only be punished once per every 50,000 incidents,
and was comparable to the various civil and criminal penalties State
Farm could face.
138

.

Id.

See id. at 1526.

Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Thomas

dissented.
139

.

See id. at 1520.
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criminal proceedings.140

The Court further noted that because juries

often have wide discretion in setting the amount of the punitive
damages award, there is a potential for juries to use their verdicts
to express their bias against the defendants, who are often
nonresidents without strong local ties.141
The Court subsequently turned to BMW’s three guideposts for
reviewing punitive damages awards: (1) the degree of reprehensibility
of the misconduct, (2) the ratio between actual or potential harm and
the punitive damages award, and (3) the difference between the
sanctions for comparable conduct and the punitive damages award.142
then elaborated on the first guidepost.

It

The Court stated that the

defendant’s reprehensibility, the most important guidepost, can be
determined by looking to the following factors: (i) whether the harm
caused was physical or economic, (ii) whether the defendant’s conduct
evinced an indifference to the safety or health of others, (iii)
whether the plaintiff was experiencing financial difficulty or was
otherwise vulnerable, (iv) whether the conduct at issue was an
isolated incident or was repeatedly performed by the defendant, and
(v) whether the defendant’s conduct exhibited malice, trickery or
deceit.143

While the Court found State Farm’s conduct blameworthy

enough to impose some punitive damages, it stated that a smaller award

140

.

See id.

141

.

See id.

142

.

See id. at 1521.

.

See id.

143

would serve Utah’s dual goals of deterrence and retribution.144

Here,

Utah was punishing State Farm not only for its actions in the state,
but also for its nationwide practices, which the Court specifically
ruled improper in BMW.145

The jury award was also incorrectly based on

evidence of other conduct by State Farm that was objectionable, yet
dissimilar.146 Therefore, because the Campbells did not present
evidence of similar conduct, State Farm’s reprehensibility could be
properly based only on its interaction with the Campbells.147
The Court next turned to the second guidepost and stated that
courts must ensure that the punitive damages award is both reasonable
and proportionate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff and the
compensatory damages recovered.148

As in its previous cases, the Court

144

.

See id. at 1522.

145

.

See id. at 1521 (“This case . . . was used as a platform to

expose, and punish, the perceived deficiencies of State Farm’s
operations throughout the country.”).
146

.

See id. at 1523 (“A defendant’s dissimilar acts,

independent from the acts upon which liability was premised, may not
serve as the basis for punitive damages.”).

The Court noted that

recidivist defendants may be more reprehensible than first-time
offenders, but that punitive damage awards should be limited to only
the conduct charged.

Id.

The Court also found that the award was

erroneously based on twenty years of conduct by State Farm.

Id. at

1524.
147

.

See id.

148

.

See id. at 1524.
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declined to adopt a bright-line ratio that a punitive damages award
cannot exceed.149

However, this time, the Court came close to such a

rule: “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between compensatory
and punitive damages, to a significant degree, will likely satisfy due
process . . . .”150

The Court further noted that a higher ratio may be

constitutional if an especially malevolent act caused only a small
amount of harm, and that a lower ratio would be constitutional if the
compensatory damages were considerable.151

149

.

The Court suggested that if

See id. Before State Farm, the Court had refuse to draw any

line between constitutional and unconstitutional punitive damage
awards, instead relying on general considerations of “reasonableness.”
See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996) (“We have
consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional line is
marked by a simple mathematical formula, even one that compares actual
and potential damages to the punitive award.”); see also Pacific Mut.
Life Ins. Co v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (“We need not, and
indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright line between the
constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that
would fit every case.”).
149

.

State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524. (citations omitted).

151

.

See id.

This sliding scale was originally suggested in

BMW:

[L]ow awards of compensatory damages may properly
support a higher ratio than high compensatory awards if,
for example, a particularly egregious act has resulted
in only a small amount of economic damages.

A higher

compensatory damages are substantial, then the Constitution may limit
recovery to a doubling of those damages.152

Applying the guidepost,

the Court opined that there was a presumption that the $145 million
punitive damages award was invalid because of the 145 to 1 ratio, the
$1 million compensatory damages award for a year and a half of
emotional distress was substantial, and the Campbells had suffered
only minor economic injuries.153

The Court also dismissed as improper

the Utah Supreme Court’s assertion that State Farm’s substantial
assets provided a basis for upholding the excessive award.154

The

Court stated that an unconstitutional award is not justified because
the defendant is wealthy.155

ratio may also be justified in cases in which the injury
is hard to detect or the monetary value of noneconomic
harm might have been difficult to determine.

BMW, 517 U.S. at 582.
152

.

See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524 (“When compensatory

damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to
compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process
guarantee.”).
153

.

See id. at 1524–25.

In fact, the Court noted that the

compensatory award for emotional distress already contained a punitive
element.

Id. at 1525 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908,

cmt. c, at 466 (1977)).
154

.

See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1525.

155

.

See id. at 1525.

But see Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21–22

(adopting “financial position of the defendant” as factor to determine
48

With respect to the third guidepost, the Court noted that in the
past it had looked to criminal penalties that could be imposed because
they illustrate the seriousness with which the state views the
misconduct.156

The Court cautioned that this guidepost should not be

taken to mean that punitive damages could be used as a substitute for
criminal punishment, which may be imposed only after proceedings where
the defendant is accorded more protections and where there exists a
higher standard of proof.157

The Court noted that the comparable

whether punitive damage award is reasonable); TXO Prod. Corp. v.
Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 463 n.28 (1993) (plurality opinion)
(admitting evidence of defendant’s wealth based on “well settled
law”).
156

.

State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1526.

157

.

The Court stated:

When used to determine the dollar amount of the award, .
. . the criminal penalty has less utility.

Great care

must be taken to avoid the use of the civil process to
assess criminal penalties that can be imposed only after
heightened protections of a criminal trial have been
observed, including, of course, its higher standard of
proof.

Punitive damages are not a substitute for the

criminal process, and the remote possibility of a
criminal sanction does not automatically sustain a
punitive damages award.

Id.

penalty under Utah law for State Farm’s conduct was a $10,000 fine for
fraud.158

That amount, the Court stated, was dwarfed by the punitive

damages award of $145 million.159
As in BMW, applying the guideposts led the Court to conclude that
the $145 million punitive damages award “was neither reasonable nor
proportionate to the wrong committed, and it was an irrational and
arbitrary deprivation of the property of the defendant.”160

158

.

See id.

159

.

See id.

Previously, the Supreme Court of Utah declared

that the award was comparable to similar statutory sanctions because
State Farm could have lost their business license or been subject to
imprisonment.

Id.

The United States Supreme Court dismissed these

findings as merely speculation, asserting that they were erroneously
based on out-of-state and dissimilar conduct.
160

.

Id.

Id.

Justice Scalia dissented, once again asserting his

belief that the Constitution imposed no substantive due process limits
on punitive damages.

Id. at 1526 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Justice

Thomas agreed, noting, “I continue to believe that the Constitution
does not constrain the size of punitive damage awards.”

Id. (Thomas,

J., dissenting) (quoting Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group,
Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 443 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing BMW of
N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599 (1996) (Scalia, J., joined by
Thomas, J., dissenting))).

Justice Ginsburg also dissented.

She

stressed that, although damage caps may be proper, they should be
implemented solely through state action.
at 1527 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

See State Farm, 123 S. Ct.

Justice Ginsburg additionally

50

These decisions show that, in a relatively short amount of time,
the Court has evolved from a hands-off policy of reviewing punitive
damages awards to establishing both procedural and substantive due
process requirements for evaluating the constitutionality of punitive
damages awards.

The later is particularly significant.

Decisions,

such as BMW and State Farm, unambiguously illustrate that the Court is
deeply concerned with grossly excessive awards of punitive damages and
that it will not hesitate to find that such damages arbitrarily
deprive a defendant of property in violation of the Due Process Clause
when they are neither reasonable nor proportionate to the wrong
committed.

Following the Supreme Court’s lead, lower courts appear to

be scrutinizing punitive damages awards more closely.161

IV.

Interpreting the Third Guidepost: Unclear Directions, Wrong Turns
and Confusion on the Road

asserted that State Farm’s out-of-state conduct was sufficiently
similar to its interaction with the Campbells to be introduced at
trial to demonstrate reprehensibility.
161

.

Id. at 1527–31.

See Marc Galanter, Shadow Play: The Fabled Menace of

Punitive Damages, 1998 Wis. L. Rev. 1, 40 (examining studies of
punitive damages awards and appellate review of such awards).

Despite the Supreme Court’s concern about grossly excessive
punitive damages awards and its desire to illuminate a path for lower
courts to follow, the Court’s guideposts have not produced a workable
and predictable test for determining the constitutionality of large
punitive awards.162

The problems with the Court’s approach stem from

its interpretation of the first two guideposts and its failure to
articulate what role the third guidepost should play in determining
whether a punitive damages award violates substantive due process.
To date, much of the focus of courts has been on the first two
guideposts.163

162

.

Similarly, commentators have centered their attention

This is not the fault of the lower courts, instead, the

problems stem from the Supreme Court’s failure to articulate a strong
test for analyzing punitive damages awards.

See BMW, 517 U.S. at 605

(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In truth, the ‘guideposts’ mark a road to
nowhere; they provide no real guidance at all.”).
163

.

For court decisions focusing on the first guidepost, see

e.g., Willow Inn, Inc. v. Public Service Mut. Ins. Co., 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9558 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (upholding punitive damages award
because target was financially vulnerable and insurer repeatedly
failed to pay plaintiff’s claim); Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church
and School-Freistadt v. Tower Ins. Co., 611 N.W.2d 789,

[needed for

quote] (Wis. 2003) (upholding punitive damages award, stating
“repeated disregard for the law and its duty indeed seems egregious
and reprehensible”); In re John Richards Homes Bldg. Co., 291 B.R.
727,

[needed for quote] (E.D. Mich. 2003) (upholding punitive

damages award because “evidence of Adell’s bad faith is
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on these two guideposts.164

Because much has been written on the first

two guideposts, we only survey them and offer a close examination of
the third.165

overwhelming”); Borne v. Haverhill Golf & Country Club, Inc., 791
N.E.2d 903, 916 (Mass. App. 2003) (upholding punitive damages award
because defendant was “cavalier and callously indifferent”).
For court decisions focusing on the second guidepost, see, e.g.,
Shales v. General Chauffeurs, Salesdrivers and Helpers Local Union No.
330, 2203 WL

22038643 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2003) (upholding punitive

damages award where ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages
was less than 2 to 1without discussion of other guideposts); Hudson v.
Cook, 105 S.W.3d 821,

[needed for quote] (2003) (upholding award of

punitive damages primarily because “7:1 ratio in this case is well
within the acceptable range”); Wood v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1997 WL
602796 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 1997) (upholding punitive damages award
where ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages was 10 to 1
without discussion of other guideposts).
164

.

For a critical discussion of the first two guideposts, see

Douglas G. Harkin, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore: A Trial Judge’s
Guide to Jury Instructions and Judicial Review of Punitive Damages
Awards, 60 Mont. L. Rev. 367 (1999); Andrea A. Crurcio, Breaking the
Silence: Using A Notification Penalty and Other Notification Measures
in Punitive Damages Cases, 1998 Wis. L. Rev. 343 364–65; Jim Davis,
Note, BMW v. Gore: Why States (Not the U.S. Supreme Court) Should
Review Substantive Due Process Challenges to Large Punitive Damages
Awards, 46 U. Kan. L. Rev. 395, 410–13 (1998); John Zenneth Lagrow,

BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore: Due Process Protection Against
Excessive Punitive Damages Awards, 32 New Eng. L. Rev. 157, 195–98
(1997); Stekloff, supra note 111, at 1817–23; Recent Development, BMW
of North America, Inc. v. Gore: Sticker Shock in America–From Showroom
to Courtroom, 23 J. Contemp. L. 236, 248 (1997); Glen R. Whitehead,
BMW of North America v. Gore: Is the Supreme Court Initiating Judicial
Tort Reform?, 16 Q.L.R. 533, 570–79 (1997); John M. Bodenhausen, Note,
BMW of North America v. Gore: Tort Reform Won the Battle But Did They
Lose the War?, 41 St. Louis U. L.J. 691, 710–18 (1997); Donald C.
Massey and Martin A. Stern, Puntive Damages and the Louisiana
Constitution: Don’t Leave Home Without It, 56 La. L. Rev. 743, 750
(1996); George L. Priest, Punitive Damages Reform: The Case of
Alabama, 56 La. L. Rev. 825 (1996).
165

.

It should also be noted that there has been much study of

the process used to determine punitive damages and whether it results
in unpredictable awards.

See David A. Schkade, Erratic by Design: A

Task Analysis of Punitive Damages Assessment, 39 Harv. J. on Legis.
121, 163–64 (2002) (stating that the design of the punitive damages
decision makes the system prone to erratic awards); Jonathan M Karpoff
and John R,. Lott, Jr., On the Determinants and Importance of Punitive
Damages Awards, 42 J.L. & Econ. 527, 571 (1999) (concluding that
punitive damages awards are highly viable and unpredictable), Cass R.
Sunstein, Daniel Kaheman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages,
107 Yale L.J. 2071,

(1998) (same); A. Mitchell Polinshy, Are

Punitive Damages Really Insignificant, Predictable, and Rational?, 26
J. Legal. Stud. page,

(1997) (same); but see Theodore Eisenberg et
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Although the Court has said that the first guidepost, the degree
of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, is the “most
important,” it has proved to be amorphous in application.166

By

nature, determining whether a defendant’s conduct justifies a certain
amount of punitive damages is a highly subjective assessment that is
incapable of careful measurement and will vary based on the
circumstances of a particular case.167

Thus, applying this guidepost

al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. Leg. Stud. 663,
(1997) (concluding punitive damages are as predictable as compensatory
damages).

See also George L. Priest, Punitive Damages Reform: The

Case of Alabama, 56 La. L. Rev. 825, 826–30 (1996).

The fact that

punitive damages awards remain highly unpredictability even after BMW
supports the need for clear guidelines for review on appeal.
166

.

See, e.g., Johansen v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 170 F.3d

1320, 1337 (11th Cir. 1999) (upholding $4.35 million punitive damages
award despite noting that defendant’s conduct “was not particularly
reprehensible”).

See also Stekloff, supra note 111, at 1818–19

(concluding that “only guideline as to the ‘degree of
reprehensibility’ becomes essentially ‘how offended are the reviewing
justices?’”); Lagrow, supra note 160, at 196–97 (noting that it is
unclear “how courts should determine the proper amount of punitive
damages to assess when the defendant’s conduct falls between the
ranges of violence and pure economic harm”).
167

.

See Priest, supra note 160, at 838 (“Reprehensibility is a

very vague concept and hardly susceptible of careful measurement.”);
Whitehead, supra note 160, at 571 (stating that reprehensibility “is a

may ultimately undermine the purpose of a jury because it may result
in the jury’s notion of the degree of reprehensibility being
substituted for that of the appellate court.168

These problems have

led Justices Scalia and Ginsburg to remark that the guidepost is
“insusceptible of principled application”169 and courts simply are “not
well equipped” to perform the requisite analysis.170
Reliance on the first guidepost has resulted in inconsistent
punitive damages awards.

For example, in Johansen v. Combustion

point over which reasonable people in the relevant community may
differ”); Stephanie L. Nagel, BMW v. Gore: The United States Supreme
Court Overturns an Award of Punitive Damages as Violative of the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution, 71 Tul L. Rev. 1025, 1039 (1997)
(stating that “the only predictable cases are those that land at the
extremes of the reprehensibility scale”).
168

.

See D’Ambrosia, supra note 9, at 604 (“An examination of

case law illustrates that a trial or appellate court applying this
guidepost will substitute a jury’s finding with that of a judge.”);
Stekloff, supra note 160, at 1818–19 (stating that degree of
reprehensibility turns “on such factors as ‘bad faith,’ ‘intent,’
‘malice’ and ‘fairness’—all classic questions of fact that are
properly resolved by a jury”).
169

.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Inc. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct.

1513, 1526 (2003) (Scalia, J. dissenting); see BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 604–05 (1996) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
170

.

See BMW, 517 U.S. at 612–13 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.

dissenting).
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Engineering, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit upheld a $4.35 million
punitive damages award even though that award was almost 100 times the
compensatory damages of $47,000, and both the court of appeals and the
district court determined that the defendant’s conduct “was not highly
reprehensible.”171

By contrast, in Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v.

Hamilton, the Tenth Circuit, in a case where the compensatory damages
amounted to $44,000, reduced an award of punitive damages from $1.2
million to $264,000.172

Furthermore, in a post-State Farm decision, a

United States district court upheld a $60 million punitive damages
award even though the ratio between punitive damages and compensatory

171

.

Johansen, 170 F.3d at 1337.

172

.

See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 854,

861 (10th Cir. 1997).

See also Schimizzi v. Illinois Farmers Ins.

Co., 928 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (reducing punitive damages to
approximately 3 times the compensatory damages of $45,000); Kimzey v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568 (8th Cir. 1997) (reducing punitive
damages award with ratio to compensatory damages of 140 to 1 to 10
times the compensatory damages of $35,000).

But see Baribeau v.

Gustafson, No. 04-01-00732-CV, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 2106, at *23–*24
(Tex. App. Mar. 12, 2003) (upholding $200,000 punitive damage award
even though there was only $500 in compensatory damages because
reducing amount of punitive damages would not punish or deter
egregious conduct).; see also Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, vol.
reporter page,
because of

(upholding $2.1 billion punitive damages award

reprehensibility of the defendants conduct and because

amount was “sufficient to achieve the desired deterrent effects”).

damages was 153 to 1 because it held that a breach of the public trust
was particularly reprehensible.173

By contrast, the Court of Appeals

of Texas ruled, in a case compensatory damages totaled $600,000, that
an award of $1.5 million in punitive damages was appropriate for a
breach of the public trust.174

173

.

See Southern Union Co. v. Southwest Gas Corp., 2003 WL

22111144 (D. Ariz. Aug. 1, 2003).

See also Southeastern Sec. Ins. Co.

v. Holte, 473 S.E.2d 256 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding punitive
damages award in sexual harassment case where the ratio between
punitive damages and compensatory damages was 45,000 to 1 because
court determined that the conduct was reprehensible).
174

.

See City of Fort Worth v. Zimlich, 975 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Ct.

App. 1998).

See also Lambert v. Fulton County, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1380,

[needed for quote](N.D. Ga. 2000) (upholding punitive damages award
against public officers who engaged in “deceitful conduct where “ratio
of actual damages to the actual punitive damages awarded for each
Plaintiff against each Defendant [was] 4.5:1”); Leather v. Ten Eyck,
97 F. Supp. 2d 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (upholding $200,000 compensatory
damages but vacating as excessive $435,000 in punitive damages against
sheriff for selective enforcement of drunk driving laws and in
retaliation for right to free speech).

For a discussion of

inconsistent punitive damages awards based on the application of the
first guidepost, see Mark A. Klugheit, “Where the Rubber Meets the
Road:” Theoretical Justifications vs. Practical Outcomes in Punitive
Damages Litigation, 52 Syracuse L. Rev. 803, 826–33 (2002).
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Because weighing the gravity of the defendant’s conduct in
relation to the amount of punitive damages is much too discretionary
to provide a meaningful and consistent constitutional test, some
courts have relied more heavily on the second guidepost, the ratio
between actual or potential harm and punitive damages awards.175
However, here too there are serious shortcomings, as was

pointed by

George Priest:

[T]he mathematical relationship between the compensatory
and punitive damages element is an odd judicial
principle.

Is there a principled reason that a ratio of

1 to 5 or 1 to 4 is constitutionally suspect in
comparison to a ratio of 1 to 2 or less?

Moreover, if

the purpose of punitive damages is to deter behavior
that is morally reprehensible, the relevance of the
compensatory loss is not immediately evident unless an

175

.

See, e.g., Shales v. General Chauffeurs, Salesdrivers and

Helpers Local Union No. 330, 2203 WL 22038643 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28,
2003) (upholding punitive damages award where ratio of punitive
damages to compensatory damages was less than 2 to 1 without
discussion of other guideposts); Wood v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1997 WL
602796 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 1997) (upholding punitive damages award
where ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages was 10 to 1
without discussion of other guideposts); see also Hudson v. Cook, 105
S.W.3d 821,

[needed for quote] (2003) (upholding award of punitive

damages primarily because “7:1 ratio in this case is well within the
acceptable range”).

intent to affect the magnitude of loss was a specific
element of the reprehensible action.

Many totally

inadvertent or accidental actions generate huge loss;
many repugnant and reprehensible actions generate little
harm, measured solely in compensatory lost income,
needed expense, and pain and suffering.176

Indeed, one post-BMW study found that federal courts generally
drew the constitutional line at a 5 to 1 ratio, while state courts
tended to uphold awards with ratios as high as 30 to 1.177

176

.

Priest, supra note 160, at 838.

In fact, a U.S. district

court in Arizona, in a post-State Farm decision, refused to apply the
second guidepost, stating that the “application of the numerical ratio
is most often unfit for the imprecise and limitless characterizations
of the public trust.” Southern
WL 22111144,

Union Co. v. Southwest Gas Corp., 2003

[needed for quote] (D. Ariz. Aug. 1, 2003).

See also

Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 919 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.) (“[A]
mechanical ratio, such as two to one or three to one or four to one or
even ten to one, would not make good sense.”).
177

.

See Davis, supra note 160, at 412; Samuel A. Thumma,

Damages, Nat’l L.J., June 30, 1997, at B5.

See also Klugheit, supra

note __, at 834 (surveying cases and concluding with respect to
application of second guidepost “that there is not so much enduring
analytic principles as factors applied idiosyncratically to justify
either a jury award or a remittitur level that the court feels is
right for a particular case”).
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A further problem with this guidepost is that it can be too
easily manipulated through reliance on the imprecise notion of
potential harm.178

For example, the ratio in TXO has been described as

being both 526 to 1 (when considering the punitive damages award to
the actual compensatory damages) and as not more than 10 to 1 (when
considering the punitive damages award to the potential compensatory
damages if the tortious plan had succeeded).179

Thus, the reliability

and usefulness of the second guidepost is questionable.180

178

.

See Richard W. Murphy, Punitive Damages, Explanatory

Verdicts and the Hard Look, 76 Wash. L. Rev. 995 1018 n.85 (2001)
(noting that courts have had difficulty in applying second guidepost).
See also BMW, 517 U.S. 559, 581, 581 n.34 (discussing potential harm);
Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch.-Friestadt v. Tower Ins.
Co., 661 N.W.2d 789, 810–11 (Wis. 2003) (Sykes, J., dissenting)
(criticizing majority for adopting potential harm as measure used in
ratio calculation).

Some commentators argue that

“The imposition of

damages equal to harm appropriately multiplied to reflect the
probability of escaping liability, achieves proper deterrence.”
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell,

A.

Punitive Damages: An Economic

Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 896, 906 (1998).

But see Keith N. Hylton,

Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 Geo. L.J.
421, 422–23 (1998) (stating that “the limit suggested by Polinsky and
Shavell is inappropriate in most punitive damages cases” because it
focuses on optimal deterrence instead of complete deterrence).
179

.

See TXO, 509 U.S. at 459–62; see also TVT Records v. Island

Def Jam Music Group, 2003 WL 22056308 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2003) (noting

Each of the BMW guideposts was intended to provide courts with
clear criteria for evaluating whether a punitive damages award
violates substantive due process.

Unfortunately, the Court’s

decisions appear to have obfuscated the third guidepost, the
comparison between the sanctions that could be imposed for the same
conduct and the punitive damages award.

Because of the Court’s lack

of clarity with regard to the purpose of the third guidepost in the
substantive due process analysis and how it is to be applied, courts
sometimes ignore this guidepost and, when addressed, often differ over
its application.
The confused state over the third guidepost results in part from
the failure of the Court in BMW and State Farm effectively to
integrate and implement reasons for the guidepost.
articulated three reasons for the third guidepost.181

The Court has
First,

comparable legislative sanctions should give a defendant “fair notice”
of potential punitive damages awards.182

Second, awards in comparable

cases indicate that a particular practice might result in a large

that, in applying second guidepost, plaintiffs and defendants used
different methods for determining the applicable ratio).
180

.

See also supra note 160 (listing articles analyzing second

guidepost).
181

.

See BMW, 517 U.S. at 584.

182

.

See id. (“None of these statutes would provide an out-of-

state distributor with fair notice that the first violation—or indeed,
the first 14 violations – of its provisions might subject an offender
to a multimillion dollar penalty.” ).
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award.183

Third, comparable sanctions are persuasive evidence of the

legislature’s concern with deterring similar conduct.184

However,

without a clear and coherent vision from the Supreme Court, the lower
courts have not fashioned a meaningful way to apply the third
guidepost.

As illustrated below, a number of lower courts have simply

stated that an award of punitive damages does not run afoul of the
third guidepost if there exists a state law that gives the defendant
notice that the conduct at issue may give rise to some form of
criminal or civil liability.185
Furthermore, the State Farm opinion itself appears to undercut
the perceived value of the third guidepost in the substantive due
process analysis.

Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy noted that

the “existence of a criminal penalty does have bearing on the
seriousness with which the state views the wrongful action,” but that
comparing the punitive damages award to “criminal penalties has less
utility” in determining whether the amount of punitive damages is so
excessive that it violates the Constitution.186
Thus, the Court has also obfuscated how the third guidepost is to
be applied.

183

.

Instead of articulating a straightforward approach for

See id. (stating that “there does not appear to have been

any judicial decision in Alabama or elsewhere indicating that
application of that policy might give rise to such severe
punishment”).
184

.

See id.

185

.

See infra notes 188–191 and accompanying text.

186

.

State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1526.

applying the third guidepost,187 the State Farm decision confuses how
the criminal sanctions for comparable conduct can be used in
evaluating whether a punitive damages award comports with substantive
due process.

In elaborating on the third guidepost, Justice Kennedy

wrote:

Great care must be taken to avoid use of the civil
process to assess criminal penalties that can be imposed
only after the heightened protections of a criminal
trial have been observed, including, of course, its
higher standards of proof.

Punitive damages are not a

substitute for the criminal process, and the remote
possibility of a criminal sanction does not
automatically sustain a punitive damages award.188

This cryptic passage is amenable to multiple interpretations.
Perhaps Justice Kennedy was trying to explain that judges and juries
should not view punitive damages as a substitute for criminal
punishment.

However, this passage also could be interpreted to mean

that the amount a defendant may be liable for in a criminal proceeding
for comparable conduct should not be compared with the award of
punitive damages to determine whether the latter is excessive, because
the civil suit lacks the protections afforded in criminal

187

.

One commentator states that the third guidepost is

“sufficiently malleable that the Court essentially is left to its
discretion.”
188

.

See Stekloff, supra note 111, at 1822.

State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1526.
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prosecutions.

Indeed, one commentator has already asserted that this

is precisely what Justice Kennedy meant.189

If that is true, the third

guidepost is essentially meaningless as far as substantive due process
is concerned.
Not surprisingly, both state and federal courts have grappled
with applying the third guidepost with little uniform success.

While

some courts have attempted to include an analysis of the third
guidepost in their decisions, other courts have disregarded the third
guidepost altogether.190

189

.

For example, in Borne v. Haverhill Golf &

See Andreason, supra note 14, at 2692 (stating that “the

Campbell court drastically curtailed consideration of potential
criminal penalties on the ground that cases in which punitive damages
can be awarded lack the protections that attach to criminal
prosecutions”); see also Commentary, David E. Hogg, Alabama Adopts De
Novo Review for Punitive Damages Appeals: Another Landmark Decision or
Much Ado About Nothing?, 54 Ala. L. Rev. 223, 232 n.77 (2002) (stating
that the third guidepost “is the least-used and most difficult to
apply of the guideposts” and “quite often [is] dismissed out of
hand”).
190

.

See Diamond Woodworks, Inc. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 2003 Cal.

App. LEXIS 872 (2003) (ignoring comparable sanctions after finding
ratio violated due process); McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 259 F.
Supp. 2d 1225 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (ignoring sanctions); Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Goodman, 789 So. 2d 166, 183 (Ala. 2000) (noting that “[w]e
have no basis for considering this factor relevant”).

Country Club, Inc.,191 the Massachusetts Appeals Court reviewed a $1.4
million punitive damages award under the first and second BMW
guideposts, completely ignoring the third guidepost.192

Similar to

Justice Kennedy’s statement in State Farm, one court recently
commented that “the comparable sanctions factor is the least important
indicium.”193
As noted, a number of courts have ruled that the inquiry under
the third guidepost is limited to determining whether the defendant
had reasonable notice that his or her conduct may result in criminal
or civil liability.194

In Zimmerman v. Direct Federal Credit Union,

191

.

791 N.E.2d 903 (Mass. App. 2003).

192

.

See id. at *28–31.

The court mentioned all three BMW

guideposts, directly quoting from State Farm, but only analyzed the
defendant’s reprehensibility and the ratio between the punitive
damages award and the compensatory award.
193

.

Id.

See Aken v. Plains Elec. Generation & Transmission Coop.,

49 P.3d 662, 672 (N.M. 2002).
194

.

See Inter Med. Supplies, Ltd. v. EBI Med. Sys., Inc., 181

F.3d 446, 468 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that “fundamental question” when
reviewing punitive damages for excessiveness is whether defendant had
“reasonable notice that its [conduct] could result in such a large
punitive award” (quoting Continental Trend Resources v. Oxy USA, 101
F.3d 634, 641 (10th Cir. 1996));

Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit

Union, 262 F.3d 70, 83 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating that third guidepost
should be used “to determine whether a particular defendant was given
fair notice”); see also Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805 (2d Cir. 1996)
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the First Circuit stated that “a reviewing court should search for
comparisons solely to determine whether a particular defendant was
given fair notice as to its potential liability for particular
misconduct, not to determine an acceptable range into which an award
might fall.”195

Applying this test, courts have upheld or reduced

awards based on whether the legislative penalties provided the
defendant with fair notice of the punitive damages award.196

Although

(stating that “[w]hen penalties for comparable misconduct are much
slighter than a punitive damages award, it may be said that the
tortfeasor lacked ‘fair notice’ that the wrongful conduct could entail
a substantial punitive award”).
195

.

See Zimmerman, 262 F.3d at 83.

The court in Zimmerman

eventually upheld the award, finding that “the appellants had
sufficient notice.”
196

.

Id.

See Waits v. City of Chicago, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9448

(N.D. Ill. 2003) (reducing $2 million punitive damages award to
$45,000).

The district court further notes, “There is simply no way

defendants could have fathomed that their conduct would subject them
to two-million dollars in penalties. . . . Because defendants did not
have fair notice of the severity of the jury’s punitive damage
verdict, the award must be reduced.”

Id. at *17–18. See also Watson

v. Johnson Mobile Homes, 284 F.3d 568, 574 (5th Cir. 2002) (concluding
that “Mississippi’s statute could not have made Defendant aware that
their acts . . . would result in a penalty amounting to 175 times
actual damages”); Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. Six Flags Over Georgia,
L.L.C., 563 S.E.2d 178, 186 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding award

some courts have undertaken a direct comparison between comparable
sanctions and the punitive damages award, many of these courts often
base their ultimate decision on whether the defendant had fair
notice.197
Courts have also struggled to determine what constitutes
comparable sanctions.

Some courts focus on legislative penalties

while others consider comparable cases.198

For example, in Watson v.

Johnston Mobile Homes,199 the Fifth Circuit compared the defendants’
conduct to Mississippi’s Consumer Protection Act200 and found that the
punitive damages award dwarfed the comparable penalty for first-time
offenders.201

The court noted that “[o]f particular relevance here are

state statutes punishing perpetrators for conduct similar to the

because “appellants received fair notice not only of the kind of
conduct that would subject them to punishment, but also of the
severity of the penalty that might be imposed”).
197

.

See Romero v. U-Haul Int’l, 233 F.3d 655, 674 (1st Cir.

2000) (stating that “a defendant, through the statutory scheme of
Title VII and the punitive damages cap figures set out therein, has
full notice of the potential liability to which it was subject”).
198

.

See, e.g., Zimmerman, 262 F.3d at 83 (“Decided cases are

relevant, but positive law – statutes and regulations – are even more
critical.”).
199

.

284 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2002).

200

.

Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-5(2)(a)-(l) (1972 & Supp. 2001).

201

.

See Watson, 284 U.S. at 573–74.
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Defendants’ . . . .”202

Other courts have evaluated the size of the

punitive damages award in light of awards in what they considered to
be comparable cases.203

For example, in Baker v. National State Bank,204

a New Jersey court upheld a $1.8 million punitive damages award in an
employment discrimination case.205

The court found that the award

satisfied constitutional review under the third guidepost because
“cases indicate[d] to the Bank that it could be liable for punitive

202

.

Id. at 573.

The court compared the defendants’ conduct to

consumer protection statutes in Alabama and Mississippi, then reduced
the award from $700,000 to $150,000.
203

.

Id. at 574.

See Tillis Trucking Co. v. Moses, 748 So. 2d 874, 890 (Ala.

1999) (ordering remittitur on $7 million award because it was higher
than other awards upheld on appeal); Wightman v. Consolidate Rail
Corp., 715 N.E.2d 546, 555 (Ohio 1999) (“The far more relevant civil
‘penalty’ in cases like these is the potential civil damage award in a
lawsuit.”).

Generally, if courts conduct a comparison of cases, they

do so only after finding no comparable legislative sanctions are
available.

See Continental Trend Res., Inc. v. OXY USA Inc., 101 F.3d

634, 641 (10th Cir. 1996) (comparing punitive damage award to
comparable cases because “OXY’s misconduct involved a violation of
common law tort duties that do not lend themselves to a comparison
with statutory penalties”).
204

.

810 A.2d 1158 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).

205

.

See id. at 1170.

damages in the neighborhood of a million dollars and at a multiple of
close to four times compensatory damages.”206
Moreover, some courts have purported to apply the third
guidepost, yet have blithely disregarded the legislative sanction,
because they viewed the comparable penalty as being too small.207

In

Jacque v. Steenburg Homes, the jury awarded $1 in compensatory and
$100,000 in punitive damages for the defendant’s intentional
trespass.208

Pursuant to a separate criminal case, a judge fined the

206

.

Id.

207

.

See Daka v. Breiner, 711 A.2d 86, 102 (D.C. 1998) (“Because

of the need to deter future misconduct, . . .

the additional $100,000

is not so excessive to render the jury’s award unconstitutional . . .
.”); Jacque v. Steenburg, 563 N.W.2d 154, 165 (Wis. 1997) (stating
that “the ‘conduct at issue’ here was scarcely that contemplated by
the legislative action”).
208

.

Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 158.

In Jacque, Steenberg Homes

needed to transport a mobile home to a neighbor of the Jaques.
156–57.

Id. at

The easiest route was across the Jacques’ land, but even

after multiple requests, the Jacques would not allow Steenberg to
travel there.

Id. at 157.

The only other route was covered in seven

feet of snow and contained a sharp turn.

Id.

Despite the Jacques’

refusal, Steenberg delivered the mobile home across their property.
Id.

After the jury trial, Steenberg contested the punitive damages

award as excessive and unconstitutional, but the Wisconsin Supreme
Court affirmed.

Id. at 163.
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defendant $30.209

The defendant appealed the punitive damages award to

the Wisconsin Supreme Court.

That court noted that maximum

legislative penalty for the conduct at issue was $1,000.210

However,

the court found the defendant’s conduct to be far more deliberate and
egregious than that generally contemplated by the legislature.211

As a

result, it upheld the $100,000 punitive damages award, noting that the
statute had failed to deter the defendant from engaging in the
misconduct and that without that level of punitive damages, the
defendant had “a financial incentive to trespass again.”212

Of course,

anyone who commits a crime, by definition, has not been deterred by
the applicable criminal statute.
third guidepost illusory.

Thus, such reasoning renders the

Furthermore, it seems that such an approach

usurps the legislature’s considered decision and is contrary to the
United States Supreme Court’s direction that courts should “accord
‘substantial deference’ to legislative judgments concerning
appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue.”213

209

.

Id. at 157.

210

.

See id. at 165.

Trespass to land under the Wisconsin

Criminal Code is a Class B forfeiture.

See Wis. Stat. § 943.13

(2002).
211

.

See Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 165.

212

.

Id.

213

.

BMW, 517 U.S. at 583 (quoting Browning Ferris Indus. of

Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 301 (1989) (O’Connor, J.
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).

Finally, in Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging Inc.,214 the jury
awarded each plaintiff $5,000 in compensatory damages and $186,000 in
punitive damages because the motel allowed guests to be assailed by
bedbugs and did not even warn them of their very likely attacks.
Seventh Circuit recently reviewed that punitive damages award.

The
The

parties apparently did not address the third guidepost below and the
court of appeals concluded that this failing did not nullify the
punitive damages award.215

Highlighting the disrespect often accorded

the third guidepost, the court, speaking through Judge Posner, noted
that comparing criminal and regulatory penalties to the punitive
damages award was simply an “inquiry recommended by the Supreme
Court.”216

The Seventh Circuit took judicial notice of the analogous

penalties and found that an Illinois misdemeanor was comparable.

That

misdemeanor carried a maximum punishment of one year in prison, a fine
of $2,500 or both.217

The court recognized that “a corporation cannot

be sent to prison, and $2,500 is obviously much less than the $186,000
warded to each plaintiff in this case as punitive damages.”218

Yet the

court affirmed the award.
It affirmed the award by relying, in large part, on the fact that
a municipal ordinance allows for the revocation of a hotel’s business
license if conditions are unsanitary.

As noted infra,219 this

justification is unsatisfying, will almost always validate a punitive
damages award, and thus will often make the third guidepost

214

374 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.).
Id., at 678.
216
Id. (emphasis added).
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
See text at nn. 222-231.
215
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effectively pointless.

The Seventh Circuit’s other technique for

evading a meaningful application of the third guidepost may be even
more troubling.

Although the punitive damages award is dramatically

more than the potential maximum fine, the court stated that “this is
just the beginning.

Other guests of the hotel were endangered besides

these two plaintiffs.”220

In other words, the court attempted to

satisfy the third guidepost by inflating the comparable sanction to
meet some potential number of violations/victims.

This approach is

not only counter-factual (no additional victims appear to have brought
suit), but it would seem to allow all of those additional victims
(assuming they can marshal the necessary proof) to get $186,000 in
punitive damages as well.

This is yet another example of how ignoring

or manipulating the third guidepost can lead to significant problems.
In fact, one is left with the impression that nearly any award would
satisfy this court’s vision of the third guidepost.
Because of the wildly divergent approaches taken in response to
the Supreme Court’s decisions in BMW and State Farm, courts need more
guidance.

At this point, very few courts can undertake a successful

review of the constitutionality of a punitive damages award.

Indeed,

most courts do little more than note the existence of the third
guidepost, as they are unable to use it effectively to evaluate
punitive damages awards.

Perhaps Judge Acker, in his opinion in

McClain v. Metabolife International, Inc., has made the most accurate
statements regarding the current state of constitutional review of
punitive damages after BMW and State Farm: “The court hoped that State
Farm would provide help for ruling on Metabolife’s claim that the

220

Id.

punitive damages imposed in these cases are excessive.

Now the court

is not sure that the wait was worth it.”221

V. A New Guidance System for the Road Ahead

221

.

McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1225,

1228–29 (N.D. Ala. 2003).
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The demonstrated problems with the third guidepost are both
pervasive and severe. The fog and confusion surrounding this
guidepost, coupled with the weaknesses of other two, reinforce the
view that the Supreme Court’s current attempt to regulate punitive
damages truly is a “road to nowhere.”222

Yet it need not be that way.

The third guidepost can be an integral part of a principled and
meaningful guidance system for evaluating punitive damages awards.223
We propose a new approach to the third guidepost that will allow
greater oversight of punitive damages while increasing proportionality
and retaining flexibility.224

222

.

At the same time, it will have the

BMW, 517 U.S. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

This is

particularly problematic because, as noted earlier, punitive damages
awards are erratic and judicial oversight is important.
note 161.

See supra

In fact, one commentator noted that “seventy-five to eighty

percent of punitive damages awards are eliminated by judges.”
Symposium: Reforming Punitive Damages, 38 Harv. J. on Legis. 469, 484
(2001) (remarks of Carl Bogus).
223

.

Cf. Priest, supra note 160, at 838 (“Perhaps the most

helpful metric is the relationship to statutory criminal penalties for
comparable offenses.”).
224

.

If were we writing on a clean slate, we might consider

other approaches.

For example, we might consider abandoning the

reliance on the second guidepost of a ratio because it seems to
improperly focus the inquiry on the injuries of the plaintiff-victim
as opposed to the intent of and retribution against the defendantoffender.

Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada recently rejected the

salutary effect of encouraging the states to become more involved with
punitive damages awards in a sophisticated and substantial way.
The third guidepost should play a greater role in the analysis of
whether a punitive damages award violates substantive due process.
Our proposal for a new understanding of the third guidepost reflects
the reality of the BMW/State Farm framework and will markedly improve
its application.

We propose that the third guidepost focus on

comparable criminal (or civil) monetary fines authorized by statute.
These fines should be viewed as a “presumptive limit” on the punitive
damages award.
This new “presumptive limit” approach to the third guidepost
would work as follows.

In evaluating the punitive damages award, the

court would look to comparable criminal or civil monetary fines that
are statutorily authorized.

The highest comparable fine would be the

presumptive limit on the punitive damages.

If the punitive damages

award provided by the jury was smaller than this presumptive limit,

use of a ratio between compensatory damages and punitive damages as a
factor to determine whether a punitive damages award is excessive for
that reason.

See Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] S.C.R. 595, 656

(stating, “that relationship

. . . is not even the most relevant

because it puts the focus on the plaintiff’s loss rather than where it
should be, on the defendant’s misconduct”).

Furthermore, we question

whether it is a worthwhile use of the limited resources of the federal
judiciary to return to the “Lochneresque” economic substantive due
process analysis.

See Michael J. Phillips, The Slow Return of

Economic Substantive Due Process, 49 Syracuse L. Rev. 917, 968 (1999).
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the third guidepost would present no bar to the imposition of the
award.

Of course, the punitive damages award must still survive the

scrutiny of the first two guideposts before it would pass
constitutional muster.225

Nevertheless, passing the third guidepost

would often be suggestive of a constitutionally permissible punitive
damages award.
If, however, the punitive damages award is larger than the
presumptive limit, the third guidepost would not be satisfied.
Failing the third guidepost would be a strong indication, but not a
guarantee, that the punitive damages award is unconstitutionally
excessive.

If the punitive damages award fails the third guidepost

and has an unacceptably large ratio, the award would be
unconstitutional in virtually all cases.

If, however, the punitive

damages award fails the third guidepost but has an acceptable ratio
pursuant to the second guidepost, the court would concentrate on the
first guidepost’s inquiry into reprehensibility.

225

.

In setting the

As noted, there are weaknesses in the first two guideposts,

see supra text at nn. 160–177, but the Supreme Court is unlikely to
abandon them.

Furthermore, these first two guideposts can play a more

meaningful role once the third guidepost is reformed as we propose.
Given the concrete structure afforded by our “presumptive limit”
approach to the third guidepost, the first two guideposts are
substantially cabined.

As such, their previous weakness of

unrestrained malleability becomes a benefit of controlled flexibility.
Thus, our proposal sets forth a realistic path for improving the
Supreme Court’s approach to evaluating punitive damages awards.

statutory maximum fine that fixes the presumptive limit, the relevant
legislature has spoken to the misconduct’s reprehensibility already.226
Thus, it will be difficult, but not impossible, to conclude that the
misconduct is so reprehensible as to justify a punitive damages award
greater than the presumptive limit set by the legislature.

Indeed, we

believe that this conclusion is appropriate only in cases of
overwhelming reprehensibility in which the conduct falls outside of
all bounds of decency.
We will demonstrate that this new presumptive limit approach to
the third guidepost is largely consistent with (yet more easily
applicable than) the Supreme Court’s general views on the subject,
satisfies the due process need for notice, is respectful of federalism
concerns, and allows for greater proportionality and nuance while
evaluating punitive damages awards.
Our conception of the third guidepost is largely consistent with
the views of Justice O’Connor, on whose opinions in Browning-Ferris
and TXO the guideposts are based.227

In her opinion, she stressed,

“the reviewing court must accord ‘substantial deference’ to
legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct
at issue.”228

226

.

She also noted, “because punitive damages are penal in

See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1526 (“The existence of a

criminal penalty does have bearing on the seriousness with which a
State views the wrongful action.”).
227

.

See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 300–01 (O’Connor, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part).
228

.

Id. at 301.
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nature, the court should compare the civil and criminal penalties
imposed in the same jurisdiction for different types of conduct, and
the civil and criminal penalties imposed by different jurisdictions
for the same and similar conduct.”229

Justice O’Connor’s approach to

this comparison is extraordinarily broad.

She noted that “[i]n

identifying the relevant criminal penalties, the court should consider
not only the possible monetary sanctions, but also any possible prison
term.”230

She expanded upon these assertions in TXO, noting, “jury

awards in similar cases and the civil and penalties created by the
legislature for like conduct can give us some idea of the limits of
retribution.”231
Justice O’Connor’s statements provide a good foundation for the
proper interpretation of the third guidepost.

However, her views miss

the mark concerning the role of comparable non-fine sanctions, the
importance of penalties imposed instead of penalties authorized, and
the value of practices in different jurisdictions.
Comparing punitive damages awards to non-monetary criminal
punishments is fatally flawed.

It would effectively eviscerate the

third guidepost because such punishments are not meaningfully
comparable to monetary fines.
is imprisonment.

The most common incomparable punishment

Incarceration simply does not translate in a helpful

way to a monetary punitive damages award, particularly in the United

229

.

Id. (emphasis in original).

230

.

Id. at 300.

231

.

TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 483

(1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

States.232

Any nontrivial potential term of imprisonment would likely

justify almost any size punitive damages awards.233

232

.

For example,

Fines are not used much in the American criminal system,

but are the primary means of sanction in the civil justice system.
Part of the reason for this is a distinctly American belief that
nothing short of prison is proper punishment.

See Dan M. Kahan,

Punishment Incommensurability, 1 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 691, 691 (1998)
(stating that “the United States relies excessively on imprisonment”);
Hannah T.S. Long, The “Inequability” of Incarceration, 31 Colum. J.L.
& Soc. Probs. 321, 324–35 (1998) (stating that “incarceration remains
by far our most common punishment for serious offenses”); Steven A.
Hatfield, Criminal Punishment in America: From the Colonial to the
Modern Era, 1 USAFA J. Leg. Stud. 139, 152 (1990) (describing prison
as the “primary means of criminal punishment in the United States”).
The United States, unlike western European countries, relies on
incarceration almost exclusively.

See Michael Tonry, Parochialism in

U.S. Sentencing Policy, 45 Crime & Delinquency 48, 48–49 (1999).

See

also Dennis M. Ryan, Note, Criminal Fines: A Sentencing Alternative to
Short-Term Incarceration, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 1285, 1286 (1983) (“The
United States incarcerates a greater percentage of its population than
any other western democracy.”).

Particularly over the past few

decades, Western European countries have implemented fines and
community service orders as alternatives to United States-style
mandatory sentences and imprisonment.

See Tonry, supra, at 48–49.
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courts have justified punitive damages awards of $500,000 based on a
possible twenty-five year prison term,234 $1.5 million based on a ten
to forty year prison term,235 and $17.9 million based on a maximum ten
years in prison.236

Similarly, the potential loss of a business

license, if seriously considered, will dwarf virtually all punitive
damages.237

This is the “nuclear option,” one which would completely

destroy a defendant’s business.

233

.

A mere punitive damages award pales

See Aken v. Plains Electric Generation & Transmission

Cooperative, Inc., 49 P.3d 662, 672 (N.M. 2002) (“The possibility of a
jail sentence justifies a substantial punitive damages award.”).
234

.

See Mathie v. Fries, 121 F.3d 808 (2d Cir. 1997) (comparing

conviction for first degree sodomy with $500,000 punitive damages
award).
235

.

Edwards v. Stills, 984 S.W.2d 366 (Ark. 1998) (comparing

conviction for kidnaping with $1.5 million punitive damages award).
236

.

Eden Elec., Ltd. v. Amana Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d 958, 972

(N.D. Iowa 2003) (comparing legislative sanctions for fraud with
punitive damages award).

The court in Eden eventually reduced the

$17.9 million punitive damages award because it was not constitutional
under the first two guideposts.
237

.

Id. at *16.

In Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, the Ohio

Supreme Court noted, “The loss of Anthem’s license to engage in the
business of insurance in Ohio would certainly be a catastrophic
punishment far outstripping the award in this case.”
143 (Ohio 2002).

781 N.E.2d 121,

in comparison.238

Our approach, focusing on criminal (or civil) fines

rather than imprisonment or other non-monetary sanctions, would
further both practical concerns and law reform goals.

Some

commentators have argued that imprisonment is generally not necessary,
and rarely available, for those defendants most likely to be assessed
substantial punitive damages awards.239

238

.

Furthermore, as discussed

The only award that would come close is a punitive damages

award that itself would bankrupt the company, but such an award would
likely be invalid.

See e.g., City Stores Co. v. Mazzaferro, 342 So.2d

827, 828 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (stating that punitive damages
should “hurt, not bankrupt,” defendant); Hazelwood v. Illinois Central
Gulf R.R., 450 N.E.2d 1199, 1207 (Ill. 1983) (“Punitive damages should
be large enough to provide retribution and deterrence but should not
be so large that the award destroys the defendant.”);

Darcars Motors

of Silver Spring, Inc. v. Borzym, 818 A.2d 1159, 1181 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2003) (“The purpose of punitive damages is not to bankrupt or
impoverish a defendant . . . .”); see also 1 Kircher & Wiseman, supra
note 27, at § 18:08 (noting that while punitive damages should punish
and deter, they “should not be so burdensome as to ruin the
defendant”).
239

.

See Jeffery W. Grass, The Penal Dimensions of Punitive

Damages, 12 Hastings Const. L.Q. 241, 258 n.127 (1985) (stating that
“incarceration normally is not needed in the punitive damages
defendant’s case since he is not the type of person that needs to be
incapacitated until he can safely return to society”).
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below, our approach would also encourage legislatures to take criminal
fines more seriously.
Justice O’Connor’s interest in punishments imposed instead of
punishments authorized neglects the importance of the legislative
judgments she otherwise champions.

It is the view of the legislature

that is entitled to “substantial deference,”240 not that of sentencing
judges or juries in other cases.

The idea here is to provide a

framework for punitive damages that is more objective and less
dependent upon the vagaries and unpredictabilities of particular
cases.

Were the result otherwise, one aberrational, yet unchallenged

(perhaps settled out-of-court), award or sentence could skew future
punitive damages awards for years.
Furthermore, Justice O’Connor and the BMW Court have been
internally inconsistent by instructing courts to compare punitive
damages awards to comparable sanctions that could be imposed in other
jurisdictions.241

This view is in tension with the Court’s teaching

that out of state conduct cannot form the basis for a punitive damages

240

.

Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492

U.S. 257, 301 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see also State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1526 (comparing punitive
damages award to “relevant civil sanction”).
241

.

See BMW, 517 U.S. at 584 (comparing punitive damages award

to maximum civil penalty in Alabama and other states); BrowningFerris, 492 U.S. at 301 (noting that courts should compare punitive
damages awards to legislative penalties “imposed by different
jurisdictions for the same or similar conduct”).

award.242

Indeed, looking to other jurisdictions minimizes the value

of state sovereignty.

One state’s choice to authorize a sanction for

a specific action should not justify an award in a different state.
Moreover, using awards in other states does not satisfy the Court’s
concern with fair notice.243

Defendants acting in one state are not

put on notice that they can be awarded punitive damages according to
the law of another state.
Despite the differences in application, our new approach to the
third guidepost draws considerable strength from Justice O’Connor’s
views.

For example, her decision to center the inquiry on comparable

criminal (or civil) punishments is logical and appropriate.

The

Supreme Court has clearly stated that punitive damages awards, while
arguably lacking the stigma of a criminal conviction, do constitute
punishment.244

Their role as punishment distinguishes them from

242

.

See 517 U.S. at 572.

243

.

See supra, notes 188–191.

Also, the Court in State Farm

noted that juries cannot use out of state conduct to justify the
amount of a punitive damages award.

123 S. Ct. at 1522 (“Any proper

adjudication of conduct that occurred outside Utah to other persons
would require their inclusion, and . . . would need to apply the laws
of their relevant jurisdiction.”).

If juries cannot use conduct in

other states to justify the amount, reviewing courts should not care
about how other states punish.
244

.

Cf. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 275 (holding that punitive

damages awards are not governed by the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive
Fines provision).

Since Browning-Ferris, however, some courts have
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compensatory awards, which are intended to indemnify the plaintiff.245
“[T]hey are private fines levied by civil juries to punish
reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence.”246

Punitive

altered their punitive damages laws, redirecting a portion of the
award away from the plaintiff to benefit the state.

See, e.g.,

Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 781 N.E.2d 121, 146
(Ohio 2002) (dividing up the $30 million punitive damages award so
that $10 million went to plaintiff, then allotting portion for his
litigation and attorney’s fees, and allocating remaining amount to “a
place that will achieve a societal good . . . a state institution”).
The government’s receipt of these funds may invoke review under the
Eighth Amendment.

See Janet v. Hallahan, Social Interests Versus

Plaintiffs’ Rights: The Constitutional Battle over Statutory
Limitations on Punitive Damages, 26 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 405, 417–18
(1995) (discussing states’ restriction of punitive damages awards).
245

.

See David L. Walther & Thomas A. Plein, Punitive Damages: A

Critical Analysis: Kink v. Combs, 49 Marq. L. Rev. 369,

[needed for

quote] (1965) (“The objective of the civil law . . . has been
indemnification of the complainant.”).
246

.

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).

See

also Mathias v. Accor Economy Loadging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676 (7th
Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.)(“The term ‘punitive damages’ implies
punishment . . . .”).

damages have been described by as “quasi-criminal,”247 and as
“punishment.”248

Multiple times, the Court has noted that the primary

justifications for imposing any punitive damages award are retribution
and deterrence, the same theories used to support criminal
punishments.249

Also, while the stigma of a punitive damages award

might not equal that accompanying a criminal conviction, “there is a
stigma attached that does not accompany a purely compensatory
award.”250

247

.

Therefore, our approach to the third guidepost of treating

Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424,

432 (2001) (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 54
(1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
248

.

Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 47 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

249

.

See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1519 (“[P]unitive damages

serve a broader function; they are aimed at deterrence and
retribution....”); BMW, 517 U.S. at 568 (“Punitive damages may
properly be imposed to further a State’s legitimate interests in
punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.”); see also
Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 4 Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice
1284 (2002) (“The dominant approaches to [criminal] justification are
retributive and utilitarian.”).
250

.

Haslip, 499 U.S. at 54 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

One

commentator has even noted, “[P]unitive damages may be a far more
severe punishment than a criminal fine carrying the stigma effect of
social condemnation.”

Grass, supra note 213, at 252; cf. Comment,

Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 408, 411 (1967) (“The one criminal punishment which approximates

86

statutory maximum fines as a “presumptive limit” is wholly consistent
with the Court’s long-standing views about the general nature of
punitive damages.
Finally, this approach to the third guidepost is compatible with
State Farm.

In fact, it reflects the most logical and useful

interpretation of Justice Kennedy’s cryptic comment in State Farm
about using

criminal penalties in determining the constitutionality

of punitive damages awards.251

His opinion implies that punitive

damages awards should not exceed comparable criminal sanctions.252
Further, he recognizes that, to withstand constitutional scrutiny,
some punitive damages awards must be lower than comparable sanctions,
since they are not subject to the same protections as criminal
actions.253

Punitive damages are easily comparable to criminal fines,254

the form of punitive damages is the criminal fine.

But the fine,

unlike punitive damages, still carries the full weight of stigma
associated with criminal convictions.”).
251

.

See supra note 182.

252

.

See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1526 (“[T]he remote

possibility of a criminal sanction does not automatically sustain a
punitive damages award.”).
253

.

See id. (“Great care must be taken to avoid use of the

civil process to assess criminal penalties that can be imposed only
after the heightened protections of a criminal trail have been
observed, including, of course, its higher standard of proof.”).

but lack the safeguards of criminal proceedings, and are thus easier
to impose.

Criminal defendants enjoy many rights not available to

those defendants facing civil proceedings.255

First, criminal

defendants are protected against compelled self-incrimination by the
Fifth Amendment.256

254

.

Second, prosecutors in criminal trials face a

See Comment, supra note 236, at

411 (“The one criminal

punishment which approximates the form of punitive damages is the
criminal fine.”).
255

.

See Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive

Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1393, 1455 (1993)
(stating that “punitive civil law omits many of the most prominent
protections embodied in criminal law, and thus it appears to permit
the infliction of punishment without constitutional safeguards”).
256

.

See U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . .
.”).

Also, while civil juries may make negative inferences against

those defendants who remain silent, criminal juries may not.

Compare

Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (“[T]he Fifth
Amendment . . . forbids either comment by the prosecution on the
accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such silence is
evidence of guilt.”) with Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976)
(“[T]he Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against
parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to
probative evidence offered against them . . . .”).
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higher burden of proof than plaintiffs in civil actions.257

Third,

unlike a criminal defendant, a civil defendant has no right to
constitutionally effective counsel,258 a unanimous verdict,259 or the
protection of the Excessive Fines Clause.260

257

.

Thus, as Justice Kennedy

See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that, in

criminal trials, “the Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged”); cf.
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991) (rejecting
appellant’s argument that higher standard of proof than “preponderance
of the evidence” was constitutionally mandated).
258

.

See U.S. Const. amend VI. (“In all criminal prosecutions,

the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defense.”); see also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759, 771 n.14 (1970) (stating that “the right to counsel is the right
to effective assistance of counsel”).

Cf. Watson v. Moss, 619 F.2d

775, 776 (8th Cir. 1980) (“There is no constitutional or statutory
right for an indigent to have effective assistance of counsel in a
civil case.”).
259

.

See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 635 n.5 (explaining due

process requirement of unanimous verdict in federal trials).

Many

states recognize guarantee criminal defendants the right to unanimous
verdicts in jury trials, but are not constitutionally mandated to do
so.

See id.
260

.

U.S. Const. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be

required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual

noted in State Farm, “[g]reat care must be taken to avoid the use of
the civil process to assess criminal penalties that can be imposed
only after the heightened protections of a criminal trial have been
observed . . . .”261
The new “presumptive limit” approach to the third guidepost would
also satisfy the Supreme Court’s due process concerns about notice.
The Court’s exploration of this notice function in BMW and State Farm
was one of the few things that lower courts have been able to discern
as central to the third guidepost.262

The Supreme Court has noted the

importance of fair notice to ensure the constitutionality of punitive
damages awards multiple times.263

punishments inflicted.”).

As Justice O’Connor observed in her

See also Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont

v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 1, 23 (1991) (holding that punitive
damages awards are not subject to Excessive Fines Clause).

For a

further discussion of Browning-Ferris, please see supra notes 42–49
and accompanying text.
261

.

123 S. Ct. at 1526.

262

.

See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union, 262 F.3d

70 (1st Cir. 2001).

For a further discussion of Zimmerman and lower

court’s focus on the notice requirement, see supra notes 188–191 and
accompanying text.
263

.

In State Farm, the Court noted, “‘[E]lementary notions of

fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a
person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject
him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a
State will impose.’” 123 S.Ct. at 1520 (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 574).
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dissent in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, “A State can
have no legitimate interest in deliberately making the law so
arbitrary that citizens will be unable to avoid punishment based
solely upon bias or whim.”264

Wildly unpredictable awards, by

definition, do not provide fair notice.265

If a defendant has no idea

The Court also noted the importance of notice in its discussion of the
standard of review for punitive damages awards. Cooper Indus. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,

532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001) (quoting BMW,

517 U.S. at 587, (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Requiring the application
of law, rather than a decisionmaker’s caprice, does more than simply
provide citizens notice of what actions may subject them to punishment
. . . .”).
264

.

499 U.S. 1, 59 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

265

.

Some scholars advocate unpredictable punitive damages

awards as the only means to effectively punish and deter wrongdoers.
One court noted that, “with a definite idea of the amount of punitive
damages that could be assessed against it, a wrongdoer would be
capable of building the cost of the penalty into the cost of the
product, at the same time maintaining low standards of product quality
or business behavior.”

Aken v. Plains Elec. Generation & Transmission

Coop., 49 P.3d 662, 672 (N.M. 2002) (citing
547).

Sajevic, supra note 9, at

However, encouraging unpredictable punitive damages awards

directly contradicts not only recent Supreme Court decisions, but the
fundamental theories behind common law negligence as well. Negligence
is usually determined “by balancing the risk, in the light of the
social value of the interest threatened, and the probability and

of the general magnitude of the award that can be imposed against him
or her, the defendant has insufficient notice of the award.266

The

“presumptive limit” approach provides notice by tying most acceptable
punitive damages awards to clear, published statutory maximum fines.
In addition to furthering the Supreme Court’s views on the need
for notice, the “presumptive limit” approach to the third guidepost
would allow the states to play a significant and nuanced role in
guiding punitive damages awards.

States would have the opportunity to

provide significant input into the guidance system for punitive
damages awards.267

By setting a statutory maximum fine for a

particular offense, states would be sending a clear message about the

extent of the harm, against the value of the interest which the actor
is seeking to protect, and the expedience of the course pursued.”
William L. Prosser & W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of
Torts § 31 (5th ed. 1984); see also United States v. Carroll Towing
Co., 159 F.2d 169, 12–13 (1947) (discussing cost-benefit analysis to
determine negligence).

Unpredictable punitive damages awards would

undermine this cost/benefit analysis.
266

.

See Watson v. Johnston Mobile Homes, 284 F.3d 568, 574 (5th

Cir. 2002) (concluding that comparable legislative sanction “could not
have made Defendants aware that their acts of fraud, conversion, and
intentional breach of contract would result in a penalty amounting to
175 times actual damages”).
267

.

See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1526 (“The existence of a

criminal penalty does have bearing on the seriousness with which a
State views the wrongful action.”).
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reprehensibility of that conduct, which would also be relevant for the
first guidepost, while also fixing the “presumptive limit” for
punitive damages awards based on that conduct.
Our “presumptive limit” approach would lead to legislativelyguided proportionality, not unpredictability.

This tack is more

sophisticated than mere pre-set state-law caps on punitive damages
Most states that cap damages use one of two methods.268

awards.

One

approach is to implement a flat cap that prohibits punitive damages
above a particular dollar amount.269

Another approach is to cap

punitive damages at some multiple of compensatory damages.270

268

.

Neither

See generally BMW, 517 U.S. at 614–619 (O’Connor, J.,

dissenting) (listing state statutes limiting punitive damages awards);
see also Developments in the Law–The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113
Harv. L. Rev. 1752, 1793–94 (2000) (surveying state legislative
punitive damages reform).
269

.

See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3701(e) (2002) (limiting

punitive damages awards to “the lesser of the annual gross income
earned by the defendant . . . or $5 million,” whichever is lower); Va.
Code Ann. § 8.01-38.1 (Michie 2003) (“In no event shall the total
amount awarded for punitive damages exceed $350,000.”).
270

.

See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-102 (2002) (limiting

punitive damages awards to three times compensatory damages in all
actions); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-240b (2003) (limiting punitive damages
awards to twice compensatory damages in products liability actions).

of these approaches is satisfactory.271

The specific dollar cap, to be

meaningful, will logically be set at a level appropriate for either
the average or the most common misconduct sparking punitive damages.
Those defendants engaging in conduct that is less offensive than
average may be subject to punitive damages in excess of what the
legislature might think is appropriate.

In contrast, those defendants

engaging in conduct that is more offensive than average may not be
subject to as large a punitive damages award as the legislature might
deem appropriate.

As for multiplier caps, they suffer from one of the

same weaknesses as the second or ratio guidepost, that is they focus
attention on the victim instead of on the offender.272

Not only are

these multiplier caps crude (in a way similar to flat caps), but they
are also not able to address situations of grave misconduct resulting
in low compensatory damages.

Furthermore, civil caps on punitive

damages would continue to allow private civil punishment to exceed

271

.

See Sunstein et al., supra note 37, at 218 (noting that

“caps on damages may function to increase some award amounts because
they also can serve as anchors . . . .” ).

With a general punitive

damages cap, punishments will rarely be proportionate.

Instead, many

defendants, whether their actions were malicious or reckless, and
without a substantive inquiry into the amount of harm caused, will be
assessed the same amount of punitive damages.
272

.

See, e.g., President’s Council on Competitiveness’ 1992

Model State Punitive Damages Act (no more than equal to compensatory);
Lori S. Nugent, Punitive Damages 29 (2002); see also supra note 15.
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public criminal punishment, contrary to the proper understanding of
Justice Kennedy’s State Farm opinion.273
Unlike these kinds of flat or multiplier caps, the “presumptive
limit” approach allows for finer gradations of legislative input. The
legislature is not pushed to set a one-size-fits-all cap on punitive
damages.

Some torts – like some crimes – are far more reprehensible

and therefore deserving of greater punishment.

Encouraging the

legislature to address the possible criminal sanctions gives it a
chance to express its views on the reprehensibility of the conduct.274

273

.

It is beyond of the scope of this piece to explore the

distinction between private and public (i.e., government initiated)
civil actions, except to note that such public civil actions are often
viewed as remedial.

See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public

Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1302 (1976) (noting that public
law litigation is traditionally viewed as broadly remedial); see also
Thomas C. Gray, Accidental Torts, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1225, 1245 (2001)
(describing public civil actions, including public regulatory
enforcement using civil penalties, as “remedial hybrids”).
274

.

State governments have the responsibility to set limits.

By doing so, legislatures reinforce moral condemnation associated with
punitive damages awards.

See supra, note 169.

Simply setting

punitive caps on a tort arguably would not maintain alignment between
moral condemnation and punitive damages.

One commentator has noted

that “statutory penalties often are outdated and obsolete[, and]
rarely are adjusted for inflation.”

See Kimberly A. Pace,

Recalibrating the Scales of Justice Through National Punitive Damages

Using legislative criminal sanctions as a presumptive limit on
punitive damages also remains in line with the basic tenets of
federalism by moving law-making decisions from the jury back to the
legislature.275

Through our approach, legislatures have an incentive

Reform, 46 Am. U.L. Rev. 1573, 1605 (1997).

However, this should not

preclude courts from using the legislative sanction as a presumptive
cap.

It is the job of the legislature, not the courts, to make the

law, and legislatures are free to adjust statutory penalties to
reflect inflation and public opinion.

“As in the criminal sentencing

context, legislatures enjoy broad discretion in authorizing and
limiting permissible punitive damages awards.”

Cooper Indus. v.

Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433 (2001).
275

.

As one commentator noted:

[E]ven though judges review punitive awards for
excessiveness and many state legislatures have recently
imposed caps limiting their size, juries exercise an
alarmingly vast amount of power in awarding punitive
damages.

The lessons of separation of powers,

especially as applied in the criminal law, teach that
such a concentration of power in any one entity in the
punishment process is dangerous and encourages arbitrary
results.

See Murphy, supra note 9, at 502–03; cf. Sunstein et al., supra note
37, at 2124 n.187 (“[J]uries do, of course, have some control over
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to more finely calibrate their judgment as to reprehensibility and
proportionality, thereby helping to create workable guidelines for
assessing punitive damages awards.276

sentencing through their choices among different theories of criminal
liability.”).
276

.

An additional benefit of our approach is that it may

motivate legislatures to engage in criminal sentencing reform.

It may

even spark a renewed interest in non-incarcerative punishments for
some criminal acts.
There has been a small renewed interest in criminal fines.

The

1994 ABA Criminal Justice Sentencing Standards “take a more aggressive
view toward the use of fines as criminal sanctions than the prior
edition.” Criminal Justice Sentencing Standards 18-3.16 (History of
Standard) (3rd ed. 1994).

The ABA encourages fines to be available in

all cases, for both individual and organization offenders.
3.16(a).

Id. at 18-

A collateral benefit to this analysis would be an increased

awareness of the value of criminal fines.
When used appropriately, fines can advance punitive objectives on
an incremental scale, and can also further the goals of general and
specific deterrence. . . .[T]here has been growing recognition that
fines historically imposed on organizations have been too small to
deter organizational criminality.

There has thus been movement in the

law toward higher fine schedules for organizational offenders.
Id. at 18-3.16 (Commentary).

In fact, Delaware and other states

have recently increased the possible punishment for organizations.
See Del. Code. Ann. tit. 11 § 4208 (2003) (signed into law by Governor

Our approach to the third guidepost provides courts with a
powerful and useful analytical tool.

We have demonstrated that lower

courts, by treating statutory maximum fines as a “presumptive limit,”
will be acting in accordance with the broad guidance of the Supreme
Court, protecting substantive due process rights of defendants, and,
consistent with the statements of the Court, respecting federalism
concerns.

Beyond those important benefits, there is a very practical

advantage for lower courts.

The “presumptive limit” approach is easy

to apply and will likely increase uniformity.
Our approach offers lower courts a simple and objective starting
point – a statutory maximum fine.

Unlike the other two guideposts,

June 30, 2003); see also Cris Barrish & Steven Church, For
Corporations, a Criminal Conviction May Mean Small ‘Nes, But Larger
Consequences for Business, News Journal (Wilmington, Del.) June 28,
2003 at 19A (discussing implementation of larger fines for
corporations in Delaware and other states).
It is unrealistic to expect that legislatures will suddenly start
to view economic sanctions as a viable alternative to imprisonment.
However, the use of criminal fines as presumptive limits for punitive
damages awards may

encourage more extensive incorporation of fines in

sentencing, perhaps reducing the reliance on incarceration,
particularly for non-violent offenses.

See generally Long, supra note

206, at 324–47; Ryan, supra note 206, at 1285.

One possibility might

be for legislatures to promote the increased use of criminal fines in
conjunction with incarceration terms of shorter duration for certain
offenses.
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the properly understood third guidepost does not demand that judges
turn to intuition and vague notions of justice.

Given this common

starting point, courts are more likely to treat roughly comparable
punitive damages awards, based on roughly comparable conduct within a
particular jurisdiction, in a more uniform fashion.

While the

BMW/State Farm guideposts are not meant to yield a precise formula,
the “presumptive limit” approach to the third guidepost will bring
much needed structure to the process.
There are some potential factual scenarios that might raise
questions under our “presumptive limit” approach to the third
guidepost.

These scenarios, reflecting either excessive action or

complete inaction on the part of the states, do not ultimately detract
from the value of the “presumptive limit” approach.
One point that might be raised is what should happen if states
respond to the new “presumptive limit” approach by setting multimillion dollar maximum criminal fines for every offense, no matter how
trivial.

This issue will not be problematic.

As noted above, passing

the third guidepost does not obviate the need to consider the other
two guideposts.

While a high statutory maximum will inform an

evaluation of the first guidepost, it does not compel the outcome.
The second guidepost must also be considered and the higher the
punitive damages award, the higher – and more suspect – the ratio.
Furthermore, there are separate restraints on a state’s ability to set
a maximum criminal fine.
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While it is a weak restraint,277 there is a

See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991)

(upholding mandatory sentence of life in prison for cocaine possession

separate constitutional upper limit on criminal punishments.

Any

legislatively imposed criminal fine must satisfy the Eighth
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.278

and holding, “[T]he Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality
guarantee”); Nancy J. King, Portioning Punishment: Constitutional
Limits on Successive and Excessive Penalties, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 101,
106 (1995) (describing Court’s holdings regarding constitutional
limits on punishment as “limited” and “inconsistent”); see also Adam
M. Gershowitz, Note, The Supreme Court’s Backwards Proportionality
Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial Review of Excessive Criminal
Punishments and Excessive Punitive Damages Awards, 86 Va. L. Rev.
1249, 1263–64 (2000) (“[W]hile proportionality review of excessive
criminal punishment survives, successful challenges are nearly
impossible.”).
278

.

The Eighth Amendment limits the government’s power to

impose fines as punishment.
328 (1998).

United States v. Bajakjian, 524 U.S. 321,

The Court in Bajakjian noted, “The amount of the

forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense
that it is designed to punish,” and held, “[A] punitive forfeiture
violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional
to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.”

Id. at 334.

The precise connection between the way in which courts deal with
excessive criminal punishments and excessive punitive damages may
appropriately be noted but is beyond the scope of this piece. See
generally Gershowitz, supra note 263.

Perhaps in light of the clearer

legislative role under our approach to the third guidepost, the
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A second potential concern revolves around how to deal with the
fact that many criminal offenses currently carry statutory maximum
fines that may be viewed as very low.

Given the current state of

criminal punishment in America, it would not be surprising to find
potential monetary fines that seem low, particularly in comparison to
potential terms of imprisonment.279

First and foremost, our

“presumptive limit” approach would provide states with an incentive to
reassess their monetary fine structure.280

If, however, a state does

not change a seemingly low statutory maximum fine, it has made a
choice that should be respected.

Second, if a punitive damages award

exceeds the seemingly low statutory maximum fine, it will not satisfy
the third guidepost.

Nevertheless, as discussed supra, running afoul

of the third guidepost does not guarantee that the punitive damages
award is unconstitutionally excessive.

Although it would be very

difficult for a court to uphold a punitive damages award that exceeds
the “presumptive limit,” it would be possible.

If the court found

Supreme Court would take a less aggressive stance in evaluating
punitive damages awards, which would be more consistent with its
approach to prison terms.

See id. at 1263–64 (stating that

“successful challenges [of sentences of imprisonment] are

nearly

impossible”).
279

.

See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-3 (Michie 2003)

(authorizing 45–65 year sentence and up to $10,000 fine as sentence
for murder).
280

.

See supra note 265 (discussing potential additional

benefits of sparking fuller sentencing reform).

overwhelming reprehensibility in which the conduct was outside of all
bounds of decency, the award might be sustained.

This high burden on

a punitive damages award that exceeds the “presumptive limit” is
justified in part because the state’s legislative judgment about the
reprehensibility of the conduct is entitled to “substantial
deference.”

Furthermore, a punitive damages award in excess of the

“presumptive limit” raises serious concerns about a defendant’s notice
of the potential punishment.

While the state’s judgment cannot

automatically equate to constitutional propriety, exceeding it is a
strong indication in this circumstance of a punitive damages award
that is out of bounds.281
Finally, a similar potential question is how courts should
respond when the state has not provided a criminal (or civil)
punishment for particular misconduct.
extremely few circumstances.

This issue should arise in

When the conduct at issue is not a

crime, but is instead, for example, a common law tort, courts should
focus on the first two guideposts, reprehensibility and ratio.
However, the court should note the legislature’s failure to
criminalize the conduct while conducting the reprehensibility
analysis.282

281

.

Similar to the situation of a seemingly low statutory

It is not revolutionary for a constitutional test to vary

according to the jurisdiction in which the conduct occurs.

Cf. Miller

v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973) (addressing constitutional
standards for obscenity).
282

.

For example, an Alabama court was unable to conduct the

comparative analysis in AutoZone, Inc. v. Leonard, 812 So. 2d 1179,
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maximum fine, discussed supra, the state has made a choice.

As

Justice Kennedy observed in State Farm, “[T]he existence of a criminal
penalty does have bearing on the seriousness with which a state views
the wrongful action.”283

Because the conduct is not a crime, it is

unlikely to be considered reprehensible enough to justify a punitive
damages award.

Once again, there are notice concerns as the defendant

would not even know that certain conduct warranted punishment.

Courts

seeking to approve punitive damages in such circumstances would have
to demonstrate what makes this case so unusual as to support punitive
damages.

The presumption in our “presumptive limit” approach can be

overcome, but it should not be overcome easily.

Up to this point,

most courts have only paid lip service to the third guidepost.

Under

the “presumptive limit” approach, however, more than that would be
needed to allow a punitive damages award that exceeds the presumptive
limit.
Our new “presumptive limit” approach provides a logical and
beneficial interpretation of the Supreme Court’s attitudes toward the

1188 (Ala. 2001).

The court noted, “[w]e cannot consider this

guidepost, because Alabama law provides no sanctions, either civil or
criminal, for a retaliatory discharge other than the remedy Leonard
pursued through his civil action . . . .”

Id.

The court then

analyzed the award using the first two BMW guideposts, finding the
$275,000 award constitutional.

Autozone, 812 So. 2d at 1187–88.

punitive damages award was 3.67 times the compensatory award.
1187.
283

.

State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1526.

The

Id. at

third guidepost.

While no court has explicitly adopted this

reasoning, a few decisions have pointed toward this general path in
the wake of BMW.

In United States v. Big D Enterprises, Inc.,284 for

example, an apartment complex owner and management company were sued
for discriminating based on race.285

A jury awarded the individual

plaintiffs $1,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive
damages, $50,000 against each defendant.286

The Eighth Circuit

compared the statutory penalties under the Fair Housing Act287 to the
$50,000 punitive damages awards against each defendants.288

The court

approved the $50,000 punitive damages award in part because it did not
exceed the maximum civil penalty permitted for a first time offense.289
More recently, in Lincoln v. Case,290 the Fifth Circuit was faced
with a comparable housing discrimination case.

The jury awarded the

plaintiff $500 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive
damages.

On appeal, the defendants challenged the award as being

excessive.

Under the first guidepost, the court found that the

284

.

184 F.3d 924 (8th Cir. 1999).

285

.

See id. at 928.

286

.

See id. at 933.

287

.

42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–19.

288

.

See Big D Enterprises,184 F.2d at 933.

289

.

See id. (“The fact that the FHA permits courts to impose a

fine up to $50,000 in addition to compensatory and punitive damages
significantly undercuts appellants’ argument that the punitive damage
award in this case is excessive.”).
290

.

340 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 2003).
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defendants’ conduct was reprehensible.291

Next, the court noted that

the ratio from the second guidepost—here 200 to 1 -- exceeded the
State Farm goal of a single digit multiplier.

Yet the court was

persuaded by the plaintiff’s argument that the “ratio in this case is
justifiable given the ‘inherently low or hard-to- determine actual
injuries’ in housing discrimination cases and the important goal of
deterring future wrongdoing.”292

Finally, with respect to the third

guidepost, the court observed that the statutory maximum civil penalty
is $55,000 for a first-time offense comparable to what was
demonstrated in this case.

After evaluating the State Farm/BMW

approach, in which the punitive damages award clearly violated only
the third guidepost, the Fifth Circuit remitted the award to the
statutory maximum civil penalty of $55,000 “in order to comport with
due process.”293

Ultimately, the court concluded that “in this case a

punitive damages award coextensive with the statutory maximum civil
penalty is reasonable and proportionate to the wrong committed.”294

291

.

Id. at 293.

292

.

Id. at 293–294.

293

.

Id. at 294.

294

.

Id. (citing Big D. Enterprises).

Although the Lincoln

court cited to and quoted from Big D. Enterprises, the Lincoln court
analysis was closer to our presumptive limit approach because it more
clearly approved of the award under the first two guideposts but not
the third and reduced the award accordingly.

VI.

Conclusion

Through BMW and State Farm, the Supreme Court has attempted to
restrain punitive damages awards.

Unfortunately, lower courts have

been unable to apply the guideposts consistently, especially regarding
the third guidepost, evaluating the punitive damages award and
comparable legislative sanctions.

Because of these uncertainties,

punitive damages awards still lack meaningful review.

Our approach,

using legislatively determined maximum fines and penalties for
comparable misconduct as a “presumptive limit” on punitive damages
awards, solves this problem, giving lower courts the guidance they
need.

This nuanced and proportionate approach not only provides civil

defendants with fair notice of potential punitive damages awards, it
also reinforces the proposition that important lawmaking authority
belongs in the hands of state legislatures and gives increased value
and meaning to the Supreme Court’s holdings in BMW and State Farm.
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